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PROSPECTS FOR TRANSITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION OF KOSOVO 
by 
David M. Ong* 
Abstract 
Environmental justice is arguably a neglected aspect in the pursuit of transitional justice 
within post-conflict societies. The international and European institutional and legal 
frameworks that are currently applicable within Kosovo present a suitable backdrop 
against which to examine the different legal pathways towards providing for 
environmental justice within this transitional society. The implications of achieving 
environmental justice within the overall context of transitional justice in a fledgling 
state such as Kosovo will then be explored. In particular, the potential for transitional 
environmental justice to reconcile (if not resolve) deeper, more intrinsic ethnic and 
social divisions within Kosovo, as well as a means to reduce the negative environmental 
impacts of an overtly economic development agenda, is considered. A number of 
examples highlighting the potential of the international, European and domestic legal 
frameworks for achieving environmental justice within Kosovo will be showcased as a 
possible exemplar model for transitional societies in general. 
                                            
* Research Professor of International and Environmental Law, Nottingham Law School, Nottingham 
Trent University, Nottingham, UK. Email address: davidm.ong@ntu.ac.uk. 
This paper consolidates recent desk-based research with fieldwork undertaken during three visits to 
Kosovo in July & November, 2009, and July, 2010, respectively, when the author conducted training 
conferences (alongside Professor Sheldon Leader of the Essex Business and Human Rights Unit and Law 
School, University of Essex, England) on the implications of human rights and environmental law for 
the Kosovo Laws on Expropriation and Privatization, respectively, under the auspices of the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo. The author would like to acknowledge with thanks the assistance provided by Aygun 
Kazimova, (formerly) Acting Chief of the Property Section, Human Rights Department, OSCE Pristina 
office in Kosovo. The usual caveats apply. 
 2 
Prospects for Transitional Environmental Justice in the Socio-Economic 
Reconstruction of Kosovo 
 
Introduction 
This paper addresses the issue of environmental justice within transitional societies, 
taking as its main focus the possibilities for achieving environmental justice in present 
day Kosovo. What are the prospects of achieving environmental justice within a 
transitional society like Kosovo? Specifically, does the notion of ‘transitional justice’ 
also encompass the notion of ‘environmental’ justice, such that it is at all possible to 
talk both conceptually and practically about achieving ‘transitional environmental 
justice’? Following an introduction to the conceptual issues raised by these questions, 
this paper will examine the international and European institutional and legal 
frameworks to assist the socio-economic reconstruction of post-conflict Kosovo, with 
a view to assessing how far the provision of environmental justice by these frameworks 
promote the overall goal of transitional justice. The remaining sections of this paper 
will then map the concept of ‘transitional environmental justice’ as well as these 
international and European frameworks onto the domestic political and legal 
institutions in Kosovo to assess their potential for achieving environmental transitional 
justice. 
 
I. Transitional Environmental Justice as an Alternative Normative Framework 
for Transitional Justice in Kosovo? 
A tour d’ horizon of ‘transitional justice’ scholarship by one of its leading exponents 
did not include ‘environmental law’ within the wide range of legal disciplines deemed 
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to be both applicable and already encompassed by this growing field. Bell identifies 
international and domestic criminal law, international human rights law, and 
(international) humanitarian law, as having distinct and competing claims for the 
resolution of ‘transitional justice’ dilemmas, therefore requiring a prior, ‘internal’ 
interdisciplinary debate on the appropriate framework of legal accountability suited to 
each transitional society in question.1 While the lack of explicit inclusion of 
‘environmental’ law (and ‘environmental’ justice) within the range of legal disciplines 
deemed relevant for the achievement of ‘transitional justice’ does not necessarily ring 
its death knell, it does at the very least signal the relatively low priority accorded to this 
particular goal (environmental justice) and its means (environmental law & human 
rights) of achievement, as an important component or aspect for the overall prospects 
of achieving ‘justice’ within transitional societies. 
  
On the other hand, a seminal contribution on the applicable types of justice 
within transitional societies formulated along thematic lines, namely, criminal justice, 
historical justice, reparatory justice, administrative justice and constitutional justice, 
appears to allow for the inclusion of environmental justice more easily within its scope, 
as a further type of justice that may effect a ‘normative shift’ in a transitional society.2 
As Boraine has observed: ‘It is when we come to the term "justice" that the issue of 
meeting the challenges of the future becomes more controversial. There are different 
                                            
1  Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, 
International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ) Vol.3, No.1 (2009) 5-27, at 19. 
2 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice, New York: OUP (2000) 5-8. 
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types of justice. Justice is often referred to as retributive, restorative or distributive, or 
even as economic or social transformation.’3 He further notes that ‘societies in 
transition need other instruments and other models in order to supplement one form of 
justice. ... In fact, advocating a holistic approach to transitional justice, which attempts 
to complement retributive justice with restorative justice, is of considerable benefit in 
the establishment of a just society.’4 The implication is that a holistic approach would 
include the pursuit of ‘socio-economic’ justice as a legitimate aim of transitional justice. 
It is submitted here that such a holistic approach to transitional justice must necessarily 
also consider the utility of both the concept and legal tools for achieving 
‘environmental’ justice as an additional means of achieving comprehensive justice 
within a transitional society.  
 
                                            
3 Alexander Boraine, ‘Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation’, Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 60, No.1 (Fall/Winter, 2006) 17-27, at 18. 
4 Ibid., at 19.  
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The term ‘environmental justice’5 is itself a relatively recent construct within 
national and international legal discourse,6 despite being well-established within social, 
historical, and political discourse, for nearly a generation. ‘Environmental justice’ first 
emerged in the United States of America (USA) during the early 1980s, as a concept 
that encapsulated the opposition of Black, Hispanic and indigenous communities to the 
location of hazardous and polluting industries within their neighborhoods. It is 
generally acknowledged that within the USA, the ‘environmental justice’ movement 
took off in 1982 in Warren County, North Carolina, when residents demonstrated 
(ultimately unsuccessfully) against a new hazardous waste landfill site in their 
community. Six weeks of marches and non-violent street protests followed, and more 
than 500 people were arrested - the first arrests in U.S. history over the siting of a 
landfill. In fact, as Skelton and Miller note, ethnic minority communities had begun to 
                                            
5 According to the Environmental Protection Agency of the federal government of the USA, 
‘Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, 
color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has this goal for all communities and persons across 
this Nation. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental 
and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in 
which to live, learn, and work.’ Accessible from: http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ 
6 For a collection of ground-breaking papers on environmental law and environmental justice within 
national and international law, see: Jonas Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa (eds), Environmental Justice and 
Law in Context, Cambridge: CUP (2009) and Brad Jessup & Kim Rubenstein (eds.), Environmental 
Discourses in Public and International Law, Cambridge: CUP (2012)  
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organize themselves to oppose environmental threats since the 1960s.7 The 
environmental justice movement was thus begun by individual groups, especially from 
poorer, ethnic minority communities, who protested against the inequity of 
environmental protection between their communities and richer, more well-established, 
majority communities. As such, at least within the USA, the environmental justice 
movement is intrinsically linked and indeed arose from the 1960's Civil Rights 
Movement. This movement brought together issues of social, economic, and political 
marginalization of minorities and low-income communities, with public health 
concerns over pollution hazards in their neighbourhoods and workplaces. It was the 
product of the intersection between the civil rights and environmental movements. In 
particular, Title VI of the 1964 (US federal) Civil Rights Act, prohibiting the use of 
federal funds to discriminate based on race, skin colour and national origin became an 
important legal basis for environmental justice litigation.8  
 
The environmental justice movement has since grown over the past few decades 
in the USA and elsewhere around the world as a result of increased awareness of the 
disproportionately high impacts of environmental pollution on economically and 
politically disadvantaged communities. ‘Environmental justice’ is therefore part of the 
                                            
7 See: Renee Skelton and Vernice Miller, ‘The Environmental Justice Movement’. (Last revised: March 
17, 2016) Accessed from National Resources Defence Council website at: 
http://www.nrdc.org/ej/history/hej.asp 
8 Ibid. Pioneering academic studies on these issues were conducted by Bullard, see Robert Bullard (ed.), 
Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots, Southend Press, Boston Mass (1990)  
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broader ‘environmental movement(s)’,9 which is in itself now considered to be very 
much part of wider social and/or political movements.10 ‘Environmental justice’ has 
thus become the subject of academic scholarship within these social and political 
contexts,11 but has only relatively recently been subject to similar levels of attention 
from an academic legal perspective.12 The present contribution examines the 
implications of the inclusion of ‘environmental justice’ within the legal conception of 
transitional justice. In this regard, ‘environmental justice’ raises issues of, inter alia, 
conceptualization, interpretation and application or implementation within different 
levels of international, regional and national or domestic jurisdiction. Certainly, 
                                            
9 See, for example, Christopher Rootes (ed), Environmental Movements: Local, National and Global, 
London: Frank Cass (1999) 
10 For an attempt to assess the challenge that the environmental justice movement presents to the wider 
environmental movement using a ‘critical’ pluralist perspective, see David Schlosberg, Environmental 
Justice and the New Pluralism: The Challenge of Difference for Environmentalism, Oxford: OUP (1999) 
11 Cutter has reviewed the early literature on environmental justice issues from these perspectives, see: 
Susan L. Cutter, ‘Race, class and environmental justice’, Progress in Human Geography, Vol.19, No.1 
(1995) 111-122. 
12 In the United States, Foster’s work has been instrumental in bringing an overtly legal perspective to 
the social and political analyses of environmental justice. See, for example, Sheila Foster, ‘Justice from 
the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformational Politics of the 
Environmental Justice Movement’, 86 California Law Review 671 (1998); Luke Cole and Sheila Foster 
(eds.), From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice 
Movement, New York University Press (2001); Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved 
Collaboration’, 26 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 459 (2002) and Michael B. Gerrard and Sheila 
R. Foster (eds.) The Law of Environmental Justice: Theories and Procedures to Address 
Disproportionate Risk, 2nd ed., American Bar Association (2008). 
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environmental ‘justice’ appears to have a wider scope for conceptualization and 
application than environmental ‘law’ itself, if only because of the possibility of 
achieving the goals of environmental justice through social and/or political means, apart 
from strictly legal means. As Cha notes, the term ‘environmental justice’ goes beyond 
merely that of access to courts and encompasses issues of social inequity in the context 
of exposure to harmful environmental effects.13 In general terms, the notion of 
‘environmental justice’ utilized in this analysis encompasses elements of access to 
information, participation and access to administrative and/or judicial means and 
remedies that allow members of public to ensure the effective implementation of 
relevant environmental principles, laws and standards.  
 
What are the possible conceptual issues and practical problems that arise in 
relation to arguments in favour of promoting environmental justice in transitional 
societies? A pessimistic outlook on the prospects for environmental justice within the 
context of a transitional society such as Kosovo would be bound to regard such a notion 
as problematic. Viewed in this way, ‘environmental’ justice is yet another untenable 
proposition – is there any place within the already congested transitional justice agenda 
for resolving ethnic and social conflicts to consider the addition of ‘environmental’ 
justice. Is this a goal too far for ‘transitional justice’? On the other hand, an optimistic 
perspective on the inclusion of environmental concerns within endeavours to achieve 
                                            
13 J. Mijin Cha, ‘Access to Environmental Justice in the United States: Embracing Environmental and 
Social Concerns to Achieve Environmental Justice’, in Andrew Harding (ed.) Access to Environmental 
Justice: A Comparative Study, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (2007) 317-354, at 319.  
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overall transitional justice may perceive environmental justice as an opportunity, rather 
than simply a further problem. In particular, it may be argued that a focus on 
‘environmental’ justice can deflect, subsume and eventually even transcend entrenched 
social conflicts of inter-ethnic, religious and/or racial origin. The concept of 
‘transitional environmental justice’ is therefore proposed and examined here with a 
view to its application in Kosovo. Can such a concept be of any assistance in resolving 
the apparently inextricable ethnic divisions that persist between different communities 
in Kosovo? The hypothesis is that the achievement of environmental justice goals, 
especially through the provision and application of environmentally-oriented 
procedural rights, can act to defuse and possibly even transcend continuing ethnic and 
social divisions within Kosovo. It is submitted that ‘transitional environmental justice’ 
is both conceptually viable and potentially successfully applicable. Moreover, it is 
argued that the current international and European institutional governance framework 
for Kosovo provides for the inclusion, integration and implementation of several 
significant environmental principles within the fledgling Kosovo legal system.  
 
This paper will explore the notion that the legal provision and enforcement of 
procedural environmental rights are a (relatively) value-free means of tackling local 
ethnic/social differences between communities. To be sure, this will not result in all, or 
even most of, the accepted goals or outcomes of transitional justice, in so far as these 
goals are not irreconcilable with each other in any case.14 However, if reconciliation 
                                            
14 Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice’, Human Rights Quarterly, 
Vol.30, No.1 (February, 2008) 95-118. 
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between previously violently antagonistic communities, who even today still perceive 
each other with deep suspicion, is among the accepted goals of transitional justice,15 
then the recasting of otherwise intransigent social disputes as essentially environmental 
in nature can be put forward as a viable alternative conflict resolution concept, along 
with its own (environmental law) tools for the achievement of transitional justice in 
situations like Kosovo. The goal of such efforts would be the prioritization of 
environmental justice, rather than its marginalization, as so often occurs in similar 
situations around the world. Through their ostensibly neutral application, high (and 
objectively applied) substantive environmental standards, coupled with the provision 
(and effective enforcement) of procedural environmental rights have the potential to 
overcome tensions between individual (minority) communities and public authorities 
dominated by the majority community in Kosovo.16 The historic enmity between the 
two main ethnic communities, namely the Kosovo/Kosova Albanians and Serbs, 
continues to this very day, creating a menacing backdrop to any local dispute between 
them. Indeed, Mertus felt constrained to assert that: ‘Kosova society is so firmly divided 
                                            
15 For example, the UN Secretary-General’s Report on the ‘Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’, S/2004/616 (23 August, 2004) defines ‘transitional justice’ on p.4, 
as ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation.’ (Section III.8, emphasis added) 
16 For an excellent exegesis of the opposing Serbian (sovereignty) and Kosovo Albanian (self-
determination leading to independence) bases for their claims over this territory, see Vjeran Pavlakovic 
and Sabrina Petra Ramet, ‘Albanian and Serb rivalry in Kosovo: Realist and universalist perspectives on 
sovereignty’, in Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Srebrnik (eds) De Facto States: The Quest 
For Sovereignty, London: Routledge (2004) 74-101. 
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between Albanians and Serbs that one cannot address religious freedom, or any other 
social issue, without examining two sets of separate laws and policies: the official law 
and institutions of the state of Kosova and the law and institution of the pockets of 
Kosova-ethnic Serbs who refuse to treat Kosova as a state.’17  
 
This proposal to examine the means for transitional environmental justice 
within Kosovo should also be considered within the context of received wisdom that 
the most effective community reconciliation programmes promote reconciliation only 
indirectly, through shared activity conducted within inter-ethnic environments such as 
the construction of dwellings by members of one community for individual members 
of the other community.18 Boraine however sounds a cautionary note on the pursuit of 
reconciliation for the wrong ends: ‘When reconciliation calls for mere forgetting or for 
concealing, then it is spurious.’19 He concludes that: ‘If reconciliation is to succeed, it 
must have an impact on the life chances of ordinary people. If genuine coexistence is 
to take place, then the building of trust is indispensable. If trust is absent, citizens will 
not be prepared to invest their energies in the consolidation of democracy. Ultimately, 
                                            
17 Julie Mertus, Chapter 12: ‘Human rights and religion in the Balkans, in Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis 
(eds.) Religion, Rights, and Secular Society: European Perspectives, Edward Elgar (2012) 233-250, at 
241. 
18 Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin, Reconciliation in Divided Societies: Finding Common Ground, 
Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press (2007) at 89, citing a UNDP Kosovo Conflict Prevention and 
Reconciliation Initiative, accessible at: 
http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Projects/CPR/cpr.htm 
19 Boraine (2006) op. cit., at 22. 
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reconciliation, both as a process and a means of seeking an often elusive peace, must 
be understood through the lens of transitional justice.’20 Thus, we should be wary of 
recasting deeper, more intrinsic social or ethnic conflicts as environmental issues 
simply to promote a superficial form of reconciliation that does not result in both the 
effective and final resolution that transitional justice ultimately requires.  
 
The relevant environmental principles and procedural environmental rights 
derived from international and European environmental law, as well as the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), will be traced to their 
possible application within the re-constructed Kosovo legal system. However, 
institutional and individual limitations of the Kosovo judicial and law enforcement 
authorities can still prevent these procedural environmental rights from being exercised 
and enforced against public authorities or private actors. As a European Union Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) report observed: ‘The performance of the Kosovo 
justice system is still showing signs of weakness. Interference at different levels and in 
a variety of forms was observed. ... The massive number of pending issues, particularly 
of a civil nature, indicates that local judges and prosecutors were unable to progress in 
tackling this urgent problem. ... The Kosovo criminal justice system capacity to move 
forward in the reforms agenda remained very fragile and inconsistent. The lack of 
progress in establishing the basic mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination 
between prosecutors and Kosovo Police, as envisaged by the law, remain a factor of 
                                            
20 Ibid., at 23. 
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concern. Furthermore, prosecution efforts are undermined by poor management and 
lack of support staff.’21  
 
II. International and EU Efforts toward the Socio-Economic Reconstruction of 
Kosovo: Implications for Transitional Environmental Justice 
There is hardly another entity around the world today that exhibits so many of the 
classical features of both a transitional society and a fledgling state as that of present 
day Kosovo.22 Yet Kosovo’s international legal status still raises vexed questions that 
undermine efforts at final answers.23 This has not deterred certain scholars from writing 
about Kosovo almost as if it is already an independent state.24 Nor is the 2010 ICJ 
Advisory Opinion likely to yield a definitive resolution of the international legal issues 
                                            
21 EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Programme Report 2010, at 25. Accessible from 
EULEX website, at: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/ 
22 According to the official, Kosovo government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 111 countries from 
around the world now recognize an independent Republic of Kosova. Accessible at: http://www.mfa-
ks.net/?page=2,224 (last visited on 16 October, 2016) 
23 For a comprehensive study of the international community’s response to Kosovo’s unilateral bid for 
independence and Statehood, see Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for 
Independence, Oxford: OUP (2009) 
24 See Henry Perritt, Jr., The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010). The ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ is the shorthand term used to 
describe the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, contained in an Addendum to a 
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the UN Security 
Council, S/2007/168/Add.1 Accessible at: 
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html 
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arising from the Kosovo situation.25 For example, on the question of whether a 
unilateral declaration of independence falls within the ambit of international law to 
resolve, Vidmar suggests that this depends on the identity of the authors of the 
declaration. He also argues that the legality (or illegality) of such a declaration is not 
determined solely by its unilateral character, concluding that international law neither 
endorses nor prohibits unilateral declarations of independence. He cautions that this is 
not to say that international law does not regulate unilateral declarations of 
independence at all, merely that such declarations of independence are not always 
issued in an international legal vacuum.26 Important questions therefore remain to be 
answered as to what the possible resolution of these legal issues on Kosovo informs us 
about the development of international law on these matters, generally.27 The analysis 
in this paper proceeds with a keen awareness of the still unresolved nature of many of 
the continuing international legal and practical issues in Kosovo, in particular those 
concerning the governance of the northern, Serbian-dominated districts of this territory.  
 
                                            
25 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Question of the ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo’, 22 July, 
2010. The Court held by ten votes to four that Kosovo’s declaration of independence adopted on 17 
February 2008 did not violate international law. Accessible at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php 
26 Jure Vidmar, ‘Conceptualizing Declarations of Independence in International Law’ 32(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies (2012) 153–177.  
27 Bernhard Knoll, ‘Kosovo’s Endgame and Its Wider Implications in Public International Law’, Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law, Vol. XVIII (18) 2007 (2009) 155-194. 
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 On the other hand, for the different ethnic communities within Kosovo today, 
the practical issue of how to live together in an atmosphere of continuing uncertainty 
and distrust assumes paramount importance. Thus, we will focus on current 
environmental justice issues in Kosovo and how these might prospectively be addressed 
to assist in the achievement of overall transitional justice, irrespective of the uncertain 
international legal status of Kosovo itself. Within this context, the recent 15-point ‘First 
Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations’, brokered by the 
EU,28 and initialized by the Prime Ministers of both Serbia and Kosovo on 19 April, 
2013 arguably represents a progressive development towards the stabilization of this 
transitional society. This Agreement provided, inter alia, for the organisation of local 
elections in Kosovo on 3 November 2013,29 the establishment of an association of 
                                            
28 This Agreement represents a significant personal diplomatic achievement for the EU High 
Representative for External Relations, Baroness Catherine Ashton, under whose auspices the Agreement 
was negotiated over two years of talks, spanning ten meetings. See: Toby Vogel, ‘Text of historic 
agreement between Serbia and Kosovo’, Friday 19 April, 2013, accessible from European Voice website 
at: 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/3609.aspx?&blogitemid=1723 
29 Article 12 of the Agreement states: ‘Municipal elections shall be organized in the northern 
municipalities in 2013 with the facilitation of the OSCE in accordance with Kosovo law and international 
standards.’ These elections, which were the first that Serbs in northern Kosovo have participated in since 
the 2008 Republic of Kosovo declaration of independence, took place over the course of November and 
December 2013, with the final one,  a (re-)election for the Mayor’s office  of  North Mitrovica, taking 
place on 23 February, 2014. Although a number of disruptive incidents occurred during these elections, 
they have been officially reported as generally fairly organised and representative. See, for example, 
European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO) International Election Observation 
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Kosovo-Serb majority municipalities, and the progressive integration of justice and 
police structures in northern Kosovo into Kosovo's legal and administrative framework. 
This Agreement was swiftly followed on 22 May, 2013 by a comprehensive 
Implementation Plan,30 and then in October, 2013 by a European Commission 
announcement allocating additional funding to Kosovo under the EU's Instrument for 
Pre-Accession (IPA) to support the implementation of the ‘First’ Agreement.31 These 
additional funds will address the needs of Serb majority municipalities throughout 
Kosovo, with a specific emphasis on those in northern Kosovo. Funding will focus on 
municipal infrastructure, public administration, rural and regional development, 
employment and environmental protection. (emphasis added) Several key points of the 
2013 Agreement pertaining to the longer term viability of domestic Kosovo institutions 
will be addressed in appropriate sections of this paper. Perhaps predictably, however, 
the pace of change imposed by the successive First Agreement, Implementation Plan 
and additional EU funding decisions have been viewed as preemptive by certain 
sections of the Serbian communities within Kosovo, especially where they are still the 
majority community in the northern part of this jurisdiction. Thus, successive reports 
                                            
Mission, Kosovo Local Elections 2013, ‘Preliminary Statement on repeated 1st round of Elections at 
three poling centers in North Mitrovica’, accessible at: 
http://www.enemo.eu/press/Kosovo2013/RERUN_ENG.pdf 
30 The text of the Implementation Plan is accessible from the EU Observer website, as follows: 
http://euobserver.com/media/src/0807580ad8281aefa2a89e38c49689f9.pdf 
31 See: ‘Additional EU funding in support of the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia’, 
European Commission Press Release, Brussels, IP/13/1011, 31 October 2013. Accessible at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1011_en.htm 
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have recently noted both a slowdown and the piecemeal implementation of the scheme 
laid down by the First Agreement.32 
 
Much also depends on continuing institutional efforts to address and resolve 
generic rule of law issues within the current system of political governance in Kosovo.33 
In particular, this will require the re-establishment of a robust legal system for 
dispensing justice, including environmental justice. Any discussion of the institutional 
framework for the provision of financial and technical assistance in the post-conflict, 
social and economic reconstruction of Kosovo must take into account the efforts of 
international bodies (such as the UN and World Bank) and regional organizations (such 
as the European Union) to assist Kosovo government institutions in this regard. Within 
                                            
32 See The Implementation of Agreements of Kosovo-Serbia Political Dialogue, Policy Paper, No. 4/13 
(July, 2013) Kosovo Institute for Political Research and Development (KIPRED),  prepared by: Ilir Deda 
and Ariana Qosaj-Mustafa, 24pp. Accessible at: 
http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/22356_The_Implementation_of_Agreements_of_Political_
Dialogue.pdf 
and State of Play in Implementation of the Brussels Agreements, Report submitted to the EU/European 
External Action Service, by the Government of the Republic of Kosova, Prishtina, 16 January 2014, 
31pp. Accessible at: 
http://www.peacefare.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Kosovo-Report-on-implementation-state-of-
play-of-the-Brussels-Agreements-160114-signed-2.pdf 
33 A 2010 World Bank report identified weaknesses in the rule of law, especially in the form of endemic 
corruption, as a major constraint to the contribution of the private sector to economic growth in Kosovo.  
World Bank, Kosovo: Unlocking Growth Potential: Strategies, Policies, Actions, A Country Economic 
Memorandum, Report No.53185-XK (29 April, 2010) para.2.11, at 20. 
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this context, the following questions are pertinent from the perspective of the promotion 
of environmental justice within this transitional society/economy: Are socio-economic 
interests being prioritized within Kosovo to the detriment of environmental protection, 
as is usually the case within transitional societies and developing countries in similar 
situations? Is the potential for ‘sustainable development’,34 including the integration 
and implementation of well-known and accepted principles for environmental 
protection, being lost or subsumed in the face of more pressing targets for economic 
growth?  
 
The dominant narrative that describes jurisdictions in similar circumstances is 
usually one involving a low priority being accorded to environmental protection. Thus, 
socio-economic reconstruction/development is apparently unable to take place without 
some form of concomitant environmental degradation. As Mushkat has observed in the 
context of the transition to a market economy in the post-Mao era in China: The 
‘relentless quest for economic maximization has not been without adverse 
consequences. ... The most serious repercussions of unbalanced expansion, however, 
have been witnessed in the ecological domain.’35 Even if environmental damage need 
not always occur, private economic actor involvement in socio-economic 
                                            
34 ‘Sustainable development’ was authoritatively defined as: ‘development that satisfies the needs of 
present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’, by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) led by Gro Harlem Brundtland, the 
former Norwegian Prime Minister.  WCED, Our Common Future, Oxford: OUP (1987) at 43. 
35 Roda Mushkat, ‘Implementing International Environmental Law in Transitional Settings: The Chinese 
Experience’, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol.18, No.1 (2008) 45-94, at 46. 
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reconstruction efforts is often perceived as being either a corrupting, or otherwise 
exacerbating, influence on the tendency of transitional societies to de-prioritize 
environmental protection when re-constructing their economies.36 Miller, for example, 
notes that a current feature of transnational (economic) production and exchange within 
‘developing countries’, which he defines in wide enough terms to include Kosovo, gives 
‘substance to a charge of exploitation.’37   
 
III. The International and EU Governance Frameworks for Kosovo 
Kosovo today is governed by a complex and arguably confusing amalgam of global and 
regional institutions including the UN,38 and the EU,39 along with NATO in the form 
                                            
36 Sandra O. Archibald, Luana E. Banu and Zbigniew Bochniarz, ‘Market Liberalization and 
Sustainability in Transition: Turning Points and Trends in Central and Eastern Europe’, in JoAnn Carmin 
and Stacy D. VanDeveer (eds) EU Enlargement and the Environment: Institutional Change and 
Environmental Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, London: Routledge (2005) 266-289, at 284. 
37 Richard W. Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power, Oxford: OUP (2010) at 3. 
38 UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244/99, inter alia, establishing the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) is still the governing international law over Kosovo. Accessible at: 
http://www.unmikonline.org/misc/N9917289.pdf 
39 The EU presence in Kosovo has been organised according to a three-way division of labour, 
encompassing a political commitment (the EU Special Representative in Kosovo) accessible at: 
http://www.eusrinkosovo.eu/; the operational commitment (the EULEX Kosovo) accessible at: 
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/; and the reform-driving commitment (the European Commission Liaison 
Office in Kosovo) accessible at: 
http://www.delprn.ec.europa.eu/ 
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of the KFOR,40 and the World Bank,41 respectively, providing military and financial 
support. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 of 10 June 
1999 provided for an end to the hostilities in Kosovo, supervision thereupon by an 
international security force (KFOR), and the creation of an interim administration 
known as the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK was set up as a temporary 
form of governance during negotiations for the final status of Kosovo. At the time, the 
Security Council was internally divided. Russia supported Serbian opposition to the 
attempted secession of Kosovo from Serbia by the Kosovo-Albanians. Serbia saw 
Kosovo as integral to its territory. As Vanderfeesten observes: ‘Serbian municipalities 
in Kosovo, especially those north of the river Ibar, recognize (UNSC) resolution 1244 
as the sole legitimate document explaining the rules of the game. As such they do 
recognize UNMIK but do not recognize the ICO (International Civilian Office) and 
EULEX. These municipalities run parallel institutions that are congruent to Belgrade 
policy and law.’42 Certain Western countries, notably the USA and the UK, were more 
                                            
40 For information on the Kosovo Force (KFOR) role and activities within Kosovo, see the KFOR/NATO 
website at: http://www.nato.int/kfor/ 
41 Kosovo was admitted into World Bank (formally known as the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development, IBRD) on 29 June, 2009. In addition to becoming a member of IBRD, Kosovo joined 
the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID).  Kosovo’s ICSID membership became effective on July 29, 2009.  Press 
Release No: 2009/448/ECA, accessible at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/97H44AA7P0 
42 Frans Vanderfeesten, Kosovo and the Question of Transitional Justice, Research Paper (2009) at 6. 
Accessible at: 
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sympathetic to the Kosovo-Albanian independence movement. UNSC Resolution 1244 
was therefore a compromise between these Security Council members. The Resolution 
gave UNMIK the mandate to exercise civilian administration over Kosovo but without 
a clear end date for the Mission.  
 
UNMIK de jure operates as the interim civil administration in Kosovo. It 
established a working approach of four pillars to carry out its overall civil 
administration tasks. These are: 1. Police and justice; 2. Civil administration; 3. 
Democratization and institution building; 4. Reconstruction and economic 
development. Initially, as de Wet notes, ‘UNMIK itself was primarily responsible for 
restoring the health, educational, and other public services; exercising police functions 
in the short term and developing the Kosovar Police Service in the long term; and 
rebuilding the judicial and correctional system (Pillar I). The Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) undertook the tasks of promoting democratization 
and human rights, as well as capacity building in these areas (Pillar II). The UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) assumed responsibility for the coordination of 
humanitarian assistance to the many displaced Kosovars (Pillar III). Finally, the 
European Union (EU) took charge of economic reconstruction, including the 
coordination of international financial assistance and the reorganization of trade, 
currency, and banking matters (Pillar IV).’43 Over time, however, UNMIK delegated 
                                            
http://www.contemporaryrelations.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/vanderfeesten-kosovo-the-question-
of-transitional-justice.pdf 
43 Erika de Wet, ‘The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment 
and Functioning of EULEX’, American Journal of International Law (AJIL), Vol.103, No.1 (Jan., 2009), 
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more aspects of its overarching civil administrative authority to the EU and other 
international institutions. For example, the International Steering Group (ISG) 
established the International Civilian Representative for Kosovo (ICR), supported by 
the International Civilian Office (ICO). The ICR was the ‘final authority in Kosovo 
regarding interpretation’ of the 2007 Ahtisaari Plan and had the ‘ability to annul 
decisions or laws adopted by Kosovo authorities and sanction and remove public 
officials whose actions he/she determined to be inconsistent’ with the Plan.44 As an 
indication of the growing EU role in the international civil administration of Kosovo, it 
is notable that the post-holder of the International Civilian Representative (ICR) is in 
fact the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for Kosovo (appointed by the 
Council of the European Union), who is re-appointed by the ISG as the ICR, under 
Article 12(1) of the Ahtisaari Plan. The International Steering Group had its final 
meeting on 10 September 2012.45  
 
The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) is now responsible for most 
of the policing and judicial tasks under pillar one,46 while the UNHCR and the OSCE 
                                            
83-96, at 84, citing Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AJIL 
76-85, (2001) at 79-80. 
44 Article 12(3) and para.11 of Annex to the Ahtisaari Plan (2007) noted above, respectively. 
45 See ‘Ending of supervised independence 10 September 2012’, International Civilian Office. Accessible 
from http://www.ico-kos.org. 
46 The EULEX mandate was established by the Council (of the EU) Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 
February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo. See Official 
Journal of the EU, L 42/92, 16 February, 2008. Accessible at: 
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continue to lead on pillar two and three activities, and the European Commission 
Liaison Office now deals with pillar four issues. According to de Wet, ‘(t)he first 
explicit indication of an attempt to transfer power from UNMIK to EULEX appeared 
in the report of June 12, 2008, in which the secretary-general declared his intention to 
enhance the operational role of the European Union pertaining to the rule of law under 
the overall authority of the United Nations.’47 However, the EULEX role in this context 
has been disputed by Russia at the UN Security Council, and its authorization under 
international law for these tasks has been questioned by commentators. For example, 
de Wet initially observes that paragraph 10 of UNSC Resolution 1244 vests the UN 
Secretary-General with the power to establish a civil administration in Kosovo, as well 
as authorizing him to delegate certain administrative functions in this regard to other 
international organizations, such as the EU. However, de Wet concludes that ‘(s)crutiny 
of the EULEX mandate reveals that it was not authorized by the Security Council, even 
though paragraph 1 of the preamble to the EU Council’s Joint Action creating EULEX 
expressly refers to paragraph 10 of resolution 1244.’48  
 
As significant and influential as these international institutions are, the fact is 
that the domestic political bodies within Kosovo have now taken over much of the day-
to-day government. As de Wet notes, ‘…since 2001 and in particular since 2004, 
UNMIK has systematically transferred powers to local institutions, which has led to a 
                                            
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/docs/JointActionEULEX_EN.pdf 
47 de Wet, AJIL (2009) above, at 88, referring to the Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK, UN 
Doc. S/2008/354 (June 12, 2008) para.16 & Annex I. 
48 de Wet, AJIL (2009) above, at 88. 
 24 
scaling down of its international personnel.’49 Despite the lack of international 
consensus (noted above) on their legitimacy,50 and the uncertain geographical reach of 
their jurisdictional authority, especially north of the Ibar river, these domestic Kosovo 
political institutions arguably fulfil a fundamental aspect of the UNMIK mandate as 
envisaged in UNSC Resolution 1244/99, namely, ‘the establishment, pending a final 
settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo.’51 The adoption of 
UNMIK regulation 2001/9 of 15 May 2001 on a Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government, defined the responsibilities relating to the administration 
of Kosovo between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. This Constitutional Framework 
began the process of transferring powers to Kosovo’s newly created institutions of self-
government. Following the 2008 Declaration of Independence, work commenced on a 
constitution, which was adopted by the Assembly on 9 April 2008, and came into force 
on 15 June 2008.52  
                                            
49 de Wet, AJIL (2009) above, at 84. 
50 Commentators have also been divided as to the international legitimacy of these domestic political 
institutions in so far as they have been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by UNMIK in relation to the 
extent of governing authority vested in UNMIK by UNSC Resolution 1244/99. See, for example, the 
rejoinder by Kirgis to Matheson AJIL (2001) above, in Frederic L. Kirgis, ‘Security Council Governance 
of Postconflict Societies: A Plea for Good Faith and Informed Decision Making’, AJIL, Vol. 95, No. 3 
(July, 2001) 579-582. 
51 UNSC Res 1244/99, at para.11(a), cited in Matheson (2001) at 81. 
52 The text of the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is accessible from the website 
Constitutional Court of Kosovo, at: 
http://www.gjk-ks.org/repository/docs/Kushtetuta_RK_ang.pdf  
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The main domestic Kosovo political institutions comprise, inter alia, of a 
representative Assembly,53 a Presidency and an executive central Government, 
composed of a Prime Minister and relevant Ministers within a Cabinet.54 Equally 
significant are the local (regionally-based) municipal authorities elected to administer 
individual regions within the UN-designated Kosovo jurisdiction. Summarizing these 
national and local institutional developments, Vanderfeesten notes that ‘Kosovo is a 
fascinating case of transitional justice, where multiple structures exist and overlap. It is 
difficult to establish how the transition is dealing with continuity.’55 
 
The 2013 ‘First’ Agreement has established a further tier of local government 
aimed at securing the representation of Serbian communities alongside the now 
majority Albanian communities within Kosovo, in the form of ‘an 
Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. Membership will 
be open to any other municipality provided the members are in agreement. The 
Community/Association will be created by statute. Its dissolution shall only take place 
by a decision of the participating municipalities. Legal guarantees will be provided by 
applicable law and constitutional law (including the 2/3 majority rule). The structures 
of the Association/Community will be established on the same basis as the existing 
                                            
53 Information about the (Republic of) Kosovo legislative authorities can be accessed at: 
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/ 
54 Information on the domestic Kosovo government institutions can be accessed at: 
http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/ 
55 Vanderfeesten (2009) op. cit., at 6. 
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statute of the Association of Kosovo municipalities e.g. President, vice President, 
Assembly, Council. In accordance with the competences given by the European Charter 
of Local Self Government and Kosovo law the participating municipalities shall be 
entitled to cooperate in exercising their powers through the Community/Association 
collectively. The Association/Community will have full overview of the areas of 
economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning. The 
Association/Community will exercise other additional competences as may be 
delegated by the central authorities. The Community/Association shall have a 
representative role to the central authorities and will have a seat in the communities’ 
consultative council for this purpose. In the pursuit of this role a monitoring function is 
envisaged.’56 The recent report submitted to the EU by the Kosovo government on the 
implementation of the Brussels Agreements states that good progress has been made, 
inter alia, through the successful completion of the local elections in Kosovo, as well 
as the official inauguration of all new municipal authorities, in particular of the northern 
municipalities in accordance with the Kosovo law and Brussels Agreement.57 
 
All of these recent domestic political institutional developments should now 
meet at least some of the shortcomings previously identified by international bodies, 
such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), which in its Rule of Law 
Programme for Kosovo 2007-10, required continuous efforts to assist the current 
                                            
56 Articles 1-6 of the 2013 Agreement, op. cit. 
57 See: Kosovo government report to the EU on the ‘State of Play in Implementation of the Brussels 
Agreements’ (2014), op. cit. at 4. 
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Kosovo government institutions, inter alia, through provision of policy advice and 
linking the concept of ‘transitional justice’ to conflict prevention, socio-economic 
development, and other justice-related issues.58 Within this context, an equally 
important requirement for the construction of a successful framework for achieving 
justice within a transitional society is institutional economic reform, as a further 
underpinning of democracy. As Barnes notes, ‘(e)specially in postconflict transitions, 
successful economic growth anchors the chances for democratic government. … 
Anyone seeking to build a stable democratic regime, especially after civil war, cannot 
ignore the issues of both economic growth and social justice as probable necessary 
conditions for successful democratization.’59 Moreover, as Boraine observes, 
‘institutional structures must not impede the commitment to consolidating democracy 
and establishing a culture of human rights. It follows that approaches to societies in 
transition will be multifaceted and will incorporate the need for consultation to realize 
the goal of a just society. ... Indeed, institutional reform is needed in all States that have 
failed and are in transition. In deeply divided societies where mistrust and fear still 
reign, there must be bridge-building and a commitment not only to criminal justice, but 
also to economic justice.’60 These opinions make the link between socio-economic 
institutional reform and the promotion of transitional justice in societies emerging from 
post-conflict situations like Kosovo, through the medium of economic justice. What is 
                                            
58 See UNDP, Rule of Law Programme for Kosovo 2007-2010, Project Document, at 6. Accessible at: 
http://europeandcis.undp.org/environment/kosovo/show/391E5241-F203-1EE9-B8551E1764A1CE3D 
59 Samuel H. Barnes, ‘The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies’, AJIL, 
Vol.95 (2001) 76, at 81. 
60 Boraine (2006) op. cit., at 23-24.  
 28 
notable here is the centrality of the notion of justice, whether political, social, economic, 
or as argued here, environmental justice within any post-conflict democratization 
project. The arguments put forward below aim to establish ‘environmental justice’ as a 
further ‘necessary condition’ for democracy in Barnes’ terms, alongside the other 
necessary conditions of political, economic and social justice. 
 
Drawing together both the recent domestic political institutional developments 
and institutional economic reform to complement these developments, we can observe 
at least two significant international institutional developments that form the backdrop 
to the overall socio-economic reconstruction of Kosovo. In summary, these are as 
follows: (1) Kosovo’s World Bank Group membership and its implications for both the 
public and private financing of socioeconomic reconstruction/development projects; 
and (2) the growing EU presence in most civil administration matters within Kosovo. 
The overall goal prioritization and policy prescriptions of the international and 
European institutions operating within Kosovo tend to reflect the liberal, market 
economy-based approaches of the member states of these institutions. This in turn 
represents the ‘internationally managed state-building’ approach of the Western peace 
thesis,61 which holds that liberal democracies are unlikely to be involved in violent 
conflict. On the basis of this assumption, international state-building projects aim to 
‘build’ liberal democracies in places defined as security risks,62 such as Kosovo. As 
                                            
61 R. Knudsen, Privatization in Kosovo: The International Project 1999–2008, NUPI report, Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2010, p.9. 
62 For a summary of the liberal (democratic) peace thesis, see M. Doyle, ‘Three pillars of the liberal 
peace’, 99 American Political Science Review 463-466 (2005), responding to a critical assessment of this 
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Sorensen observes in relation to these Western-centric liberal democratic efforts within 
the former communist/socialist transitional economies, ‘[t]he policy prescriptions are 
liberalization, privatization and structural adjustment.’63 
 
These post-conflict social and economic reconstruction efforts in Kosovo have 
consistently aimed to create the legal conditions and social climate for a market 
economy. The agents in this process are typically envisaged to be small and medium-
scale enterprises, but larger infrastructure and capital-intensive projects are also being 
undertaken.64 Evidence on the ground suggests that both economic, and to a certain 
extent social, reconstruction efforts are underway in Kosovo.65 While Kosovo’s 
economic transition is largely managed by the World Bank and its sister agencies, the 
reconstruction of Kosovo’s political, social, and legal, infrastructures are being 
coordinated by the EU. Both these international and EU institutional frameworks for 
                                            
thesis by S. Rosato, ‘The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory’, 97 American Political Science 
Review 585– 602 (2003). 
63 Jens Sorensen, State Collapse and Reconstruction in the Periphery: Political Economy, Ethnicity and 
Development in Yugoslavia, Serbia and Kosovo, Berghahn, New York (2009) at 54. 
64 Sorensen (2009) above, at 11. 
65 According to an early World Bank assessment, there has been a recovery of economic activity and 
positive growth since 2000. However, this initial economic growth performance was driven by a post-
conflict boom financed by official aid flows and prognosticated as unlikely to be sustainable. See World 
Bank, Kosovo: Economic Memorandum, Report No.28023-KOS, Poverty Reduction and Economic 
Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, World Bank, 17 May 2004. Accessible at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKOSOVO/Data%20and%20Reference/20243120/KEM-5-17-
2004%20with%20amendments.pdf. 
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financial and technical assistance will be examined with a view to assessing their roles 
in providing for transitional environmental justice within Kosovo. 
 
A. Kosovo and Public International Finance Institutions: Alternative Accountability 
Mechanisms 
Despite its still uncertain international legal status, Kosovo has been able to join the 
World Bank. This is an important legitimacy signifier of Kosovo’s arrival within the 
international community and is regarded as such by its leadership.66 The value of World 
Bank membership as a catalyst for economic re-construction efforts within Kosovo, 
whether in the public or private sectors of the economy, cannot be underestimated. So 
too the wider social implications of this membership for either the reconciliation or re-
trenchment of the different communities within Kosovo. The role of the World Bank in 
post-conflict, transitional societies like Kosovo is envisaged by the premise accepted 
by the UN that ‘(e)conomy recovery is essential to fulfilling the ultimate UN goal of 
preventing and resolving conflicts’67, thus requiring, according to the UN Millennium 
Declaration, ‘greater policy coherence and better co-operation between the United 
Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade 
                                            
66 See Appendix: Interview with Dr Fatmir Sejdiu, President of the Republic of Kosovo, in Aidan Hehir 
(ed) Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The international community and the transition to 
independence, London: Routledge (2010) at 197-198: As President Sejdiu asserts ‘(t)he fact that many 
of the countries who have not recognized Kosovo voted in favour of Kosovo’s membership of the IMF 
and World Bank is a strong, positive signal in the right direction.’ 
67 Allan Gerson, ‘Peace Building: The Private Sector’s Role’, AJIL Vol.95, No.1 (January, 2001) 102-
119, at 103. 
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Organization, as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving a fully 
coordinated approach to the peace and development.’68  
 
Apart from the UN and its agencies, the World Bank is arguably the most significant 
multilateral institution for Kosovo’s socio-economic regeneration. It provides 
assistance, inter alia, through investment loans, technical assistance, institutional 
development loans and credits, and partnerships. The International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) – the private sector arm of the World Bank Group - assists business corporations 
operating within risky settings. The long-term aim of the World Bank and its sister 
organizations such as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
is to stimulate private individual or institutional foreign investment into Kosovo, 
whether from non-Kosovar sources, or the K-Albanian diaspora. While leaders of post-
conflict states have strong incentives for trying to attract international investments, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) may view these states as high-risk since the 
reoccurrence of violence in the aftermath of civil conflict is common. Consequently, 
leaders of post-conflict states desperate to receive foreign direct investments to help 
ignite their stalled economies must convince MNCs that their state is a stable and secure 
place to invest in. Appel and Loyle argue that post-conflict justice (PCJ) institutions 
can help post-conflict states attract such international investment. The domestic and 
reputational costs associated with implementing PCJ allow states to send a credible 
signal to international investors about the state's willingness to pursue the successful 
reconstruction of the post-conflict zone. Under these conditions, uncertainty is lessened 
and foreign investors can feel more confident about making investments. Statistical 
                                            
68 UN Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2 (18 September, 2000), at para.9. 
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tests confirm the relationship between post-conflict justice institutions and FDI from 
1970-2001. Post-conflict states that implement restorative justice processes in the post-
conflict period receive higher levels of FDI than those countries that refrain from 
establishing these post-conflict institutions, or do not implement a restorative justice 
process.69 
 
An example of this type of public international financial institution-induced 
international investment strategy in Kosovo can be seen in the financial and especially 
the technical support provided by the World Bank group and its related agencies for the 
privatization of the previously public/socially-owned Kosovo energy power-generating 
company, known locally as KEK. On the other hand, the international public 
accountability mechanisms available to both KEK workers and members of the general 
public as a result of the participation of World Bank group institutions within this 
project serve to highlight the absence of similarly effective domestic institutional 
accountability mechanisms within Kosovo at the present time.  
 
The KEK case study is as follows: An initial USD$5 million International 
Development Association (IDA) grant was made to the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) in late June, 2007 to support the KEK and domestic Kosovar authorities 
clean-up a gasification plant to enhance Kosovo’s long-term power development and 
                                            
69 Benjamin J Appel and Cyanne E Loyle, The economic benefits of justice: Post-conflict justice and 
foreign direct investment, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 49, No. 5 (September 2012) 685-699. 
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electricity supply and mitigate an urgent health risk to public health and environment 
in Kosovo. Following this clean-up operation, International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
Advisory Services were deployed in 2009 to assess and prepare KEK for the possible 
unbundling and privatization of the electricity distribution functions of KEK via private 
sector participation (PSP) i.e., the private economic actors involved in this project. 
However, in August 2011, a confidential complaint was made to the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the IFC. Previously, the IFC has summarized its 
justification for the role and function of the CAO in general terms as follows: 
‘Recognizing the importance of accountability and that the concerns and complaints of 
project-affected people should be addressed in a manner that is fair, objective, and 
constructive, a mechanism has been established through the CAO to enable individuals 
and communities affected by IFC projects to raise their concerns to an independent 
oversight authority. The CAO is independent of IFC management and reports directly 
to the President of the World Bank Group. The CAO responds to complaints from those 
affected by IFC-financed projects and attempts to resolve them through a flexible 
problem-solving approach, and to enhance the social and environmental outcomes of 
projects. In addition, the CAO oversees audits of IFC’s social and environmental 
performance, particularly in relation to sensitive projects, to ascertain compliance with 
policies, guidelines, procedures, and systems. Complaints may relate to any aspect of 
an IFC-financed project that is within the mandate of the CAO. They can be made by 
 34 
any individual, group, community, entity, or other party affected or likely to be affected 
by the social or environmental impacts of an IFC-financed project.’70  
 
Following the publication of the updated, 2012 edition of the IFC’s 
Sustainability Framework,71 the language on the CAO within the IFC’s Policy on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability has arguably been tightened-up, as noted 
below:  
‘IFC supports its clients in addressing environmental and social issues arising from their 
business activities by requiring them to set up and administer appropriate mechanisms 
and/or procedures to address related grievances and complaints from ‘affected 
communities’. In addition to these mechanisms and procedures, the role of 
administrative and/or legal procedures available in the host country should also be 
considered. Nonetheless, there may be cases where grievances and complaints from 
those affected by IFC-supported business activities are not fully resolved at the business 
activity level or through other established mechanisms.’72 The CAO responds to 
                                            
70 Source: International Finance Corporation’s Policy on Social & Environmental Sustainability (2006), 
Section 4, accessible from: http://www.ifc.org/sustainability.  More information on the CAO can be 
accessed at: 
http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ 
71 The updated 2012 edition of IFC's Sustainability Framework applies to all investment and advisory 
clients whose projects go through IFC's initial credit review process after January 1, 2012. Accessible at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/ifc+sustainability/
sustainability+framework/sustainability+framework+-+2012/framework_2012 
72 IFC Environmental and Social Sustainability Policy, 1 January, 2012, Chapter/Section on the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), at para.54. 
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complaints from those affected by IFC-supported business activities with the goal of 
enhancing environmental and social outcomes on the ground and fostering greater 
public accountability of IFC. As mentioned above, the CAO works to resolve 
complaints using a flexible problem-solving approach through the CAO’s dispute 
resolution arm. Moreover, through its compliance arm, the CAO oversees project-level 
audits of IFC’s environmental and social performance in accordance with the CAO’s 
operational guidelines.73  
 
More generally, the IFC has established the following generic principles as 
intrinsic to individual project-level grievance mechanisms involving private companies 
investing/operating in emerging markets. These are listed here as follows:  
‘1. Proportionality: Scaled to risk and adverse impact on affected communities  
2. Cultural Appropriateness: Designed taking into account culturally appropriate ways 
of handling community concerns  
3. Accessibility: Clear and understandable mechanism that is accessible to all segments 
of the affected communities at no cost  
4. Transparency and Accountability: To all stakeholders  
5. Appropriate Protection: A mechanism that prevents retribution and does not impede 
access to other remedies.’74 
 
                                            
73 Ibid., at para.56. 
74 IFC Good Practice Note, Addressing Grievances from Project-Affected Communities: Guidance for 
Projects and Companies on Designing Grievance Mechanisms, No.7 (September, 2009) 44pp., at p.3. 
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With regards to the IFC role in the KEK privatization project, the Kosovar 
complainants contended that access to information regarding the privatization was 
inadequate to allow people to address potential adverse impacts of the process, and 
failure to conduct an appropriate Social and Environmental Assessment, which did not 
take into account project impacts on relevant members of the community and 
workforce, as well as the environment. In September, 2011 the CAO found the 
complaint eligible for further assessment and CAO’s Ombudsman team conducted two 
field trips to Pristina, Kosovo, in November that year. Numerous stakeholders affirmed 
their willingness to engage in a collaborative process to address the issues raised in the 
complaint. However, following a thorough discussion of the CAO mandate, functions, 
services, and processes, the complainants informed CAO that they considered their 
interests (and those of the Kosovar public) would be best served by CAO’s compliance 
function. The CAO Ombudsman concluded its involvement and the case was formally 
transferred to CAO’s compliance team in January, 2012. Following an appraisal of the 
IFC’s role in this project, the CAO concluded in April, 2012 that an audit of IFC's 
advisory services for the project was merited. Accordingly, the CAO drew-up Terms of 
Reference for an investigation into the scope of the IFC’s social and environmental due 
diligence review for this project. However, the CAO will not audit IFC clients, i.e., the 
Private Sector Partners (PSPs), as it considers only issues related to the IFC 
performance in this exercise. Therefore, the CAO did not pass any judgment on the 
performance of IFC’s client in the KEK privatization process. The provision of an 
international and ostensibly independent individual grievance mechanism, especially 
within a transitional society such as Kosovo, where confidence in local administrative 
and judicial systems is nascent and still riven with communal divisions, represents a 
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positive sign in favour of such international financial institutional intervention, despite 
continuing fears such grievance/complaint mechanisms only apply in these 
finance/economically-oriented circumstances. 
 
Apart from the World Bank and its associated institutions, a number of EU 
Member States, public (and private) International Finance Institutions (IFIs), other 
organisations and bilateral donors are also active in Kosovo. Previously, both public 
and private IFI involvement in Kosovo is limited, for reasons related to the Kosovo 
status issue. More recently, however, and especially since the adoption of the 2013 
Brussels Agreement brokered by the EU between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, 
the pathways towards Kosovo membership of the European-based public international 
finance institutions have been smoothed over. Thus, Kosovo has been able to further 
develop its relations with major international financial institutions. For example, it has 
continued to successfully implement the 20-month €105 million Stand-By Arrangement 
(SBA), negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2012. In 
December 2012, Kosovo became a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and in June 2013, Kosovo signed a Framework Agreement 
with the European Investment Bank (EIB), which allows the EIB to finance projects in 
Kosovo.75 
                                            
75 See: Kosovo 2013 Progress Report, Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying the 
document Communication from The Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, 2013-2014 {COM(2013) 700 final} European Commission, 
Brussels, SWD(2013) 416 final,  16.10.2013. Accessible at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ks_rapport_2013.pdf 
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Regular coordination meetings with EU Member States and other donors 
present in Kosovo are called and chaired by the European Commission’s Liaison Office 
(ECLO). This is a further indication of the leading role played by the EU in the overall 
co-ordination of the financial and technical assistance efforts of the international 
community and its individual members. The overarching international governance role 
played by the EU within the Kosovo context cannot be underestimated and will be 
enlarged upon in the following section of this paper. The Kosovo government has also 
established the (Kosovo) Agency for Coordination of Development and European 
Integration to assist with EU co-ordination of all these international assistance efforts. 
Close coordination and division of tasks with other donors should be ensured under the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) programme, described below. The main bilateral 
cooperation partners of the European Commission are Germany, Switzerland, Norway, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, UK and the USA. The fact that many of these donor countries 
are Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members has 
not gone unnoticed. Kang and Meernik contend, inter alia, that both the national 
attributes of the conflict nations and the characteristics of the conflicts from which they 
have emerged explain the amount of economic assistance that states provide. Their 
findings reveal that such national attributes as humanitarian need, economic openness, 
and regime transition, as well as conflict characteristics such as military intervention 
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and conflict issues affect international aid levels. Foreign aid levels also tend to increase 
after conflicts, but then begin to level off after several years.76 
 
What is also notable from these international and bilateral donor 
funded/supported activities above is the lack of environmental initiatives. As the UNDP 
in Kosovo’s Programme on ‘Democratic Governance and Environment’ notes, the 
‘environment’ generally and environmental protection in particular has not been high 
on the agenda for the Kosovo government.77 During the transition period from a 
socialist into a market economy, environmental issues were constantly neglected in 
Kosovo. However, environmental degradation is closely linked to the issues of human 
health and sustainable development, hence making it an extremely important issue that 
needs to be addressed. The Kosovo government is equipped with most of the necessary 
legislation on environmental protection. Yet, there is a continuing lack of institutional 
and human resource capacity regarding its implementation and enforcement. 
Environmental awareness is very low among the general public, which is an obstacle 
for the effective implementation of environmental projects. On the other hand, 
environmental protection is an important criterion for fulfilling the European 
integration agenda. Achieving the standards established by international environmental 
conventions will therefore be important for Kosovo. However, many of the general 
                                            
76 Seonjou Kang and James Meernik, Determinants of Post-Conflict Economic Assistance, Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 41, No. 2 (March, 2004) 149-166. 
77 Accessible at: http://www.ks.undp.org/ 
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findings of a 2009 UNDP workshop pertaining to Kosovo’s shortcomings in this regard 
are still applicable today, as follows:  
• Kosovo is not a Party to any of the UN environmental conventions, and thus is not 
able to participate in international meetings, or to receive funding through their 
financial mechanisms; 
• Kosovo is striving to follow the EU environmental standards and Acquis 
Communautaire; 
• There exists incomplete application of EU environmental legislation and insufficient 
implementation of the already applied legislation; 
• There is a need for wide-ranging donor support in all environmental activities in 
Kosovo; 
• There are no defined sectoral action plans (programmes) in place for addressing 
environmental issues; 
• There is weak administrative capacity within the institutions involved in 
environmental protection; this is a problem at all levels, including central government 
and municipal regions; 
• There is insufficient communication between the ministries, as well as between other 
stakeholders;  
• There is a lack of institutional capacities for developing and implementing 
environmental policies at all levels; 
• The lack of expertise and knowledge of the administrative staff and the lack of training 
programmes acts as a barrier; 
• Environmental monitoring and data gathering systems are non-existent, which leads 
to unavailability of crucial data; 
 41 
• There are insufficient economic instruments for incentivizing environmental 
protection; 
• Lack of knowledge and awareness of environmental issues and lack of participation 
from the general public and NGOs in decision-making both hinder progress; 
• Kosovo is at the initial stage of joining the international efforts in the environmental 
protection sphere and should start with essential steps, such as formulation of strategic 
policies, building the necessary legal and institutional frameworks, and developing 
expertise and capacity within the administrative institutions in line with EU 
requirements; and  
• Alongside development of the necessary policy and legislative framework, there is a 
need to continue the implementation of environmental projects.78 
 
 The above findings both reinforced, and reiterated in more detail, the 
conclusions of an earlier, 2006 UNDP report, on ‘Developing capacity in Kosovo to 
become a Party to the Rio Conventions’, which outlined the need for the following 
issues to be addressed: Designation of a Convention’s National Focal Point; 
development of compliance assessment/plans; development of a Convention Action 
Plan; identification of financial assistance; development of an investment plan; 
increasing awareness of decision-makers on environment-related issues; developing 
capacity of the (Kosovo) Ministry for Environment and Spatial Planning (MESP), 
                                            
78 See Report on UNDP Environment Workshop (following a Climate Change Conference), 1-2 May 
2009, at 19. Accessible at: 
http://www.ks.undp.org/repository/docs/UNDP_workshop_EV.pdf 
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municipalities and other stakeholder organisations; and establishing an environmental 
monitoring system.79 Following on from these reports, UNDP Kosovo’s major 
objectives and strategic priorities for 2010-2011 were established as, inter alia, 
assisting Kosovo to meet the commitments of the major global environmental 
conventions in the areas of climate change and biodiversity conservation. These 
commitments were to be met through the following means: Enhanced institutional 
commitments and ownership of environmental concerns, through building capacities of 
the MESP to develop policies and coordinate activities in the areas of climate change 
and renewable energy, biodiversity conservation, industrial pollution and 
contamination, and water governance.80 The following section will detail how far the 
deficiencies found in both institutional and substantive areas of Kosovo’s 
environmental law have been addressed through its engagement with the EU under the 
EULEX mission and the EU Pre-Accession Programme. 
 
B. Kosovo and the European Union: Harmonizing Standards Prior to Possible 
Accession 
As for the EU role within the Kosovo governance framework, with a mandate until 14 
June 2014,81 EULEX is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the EU’s 
                                            
79 See 2009 UNDP Report ibid., at 20. 
80 Accessible from UNDP Kosovo website at: 
http://www.ks.undp.org/index.php?cid=2,160 
81 Council Decision 2012/291/CFSP of 5 June 2012 amending and extending Joint Action 
2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo. Accessible 
at: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/LexUriServ-2012.pdf 
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Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).82 The central aim of EULEX is to assist 
and support the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, 
judiciary and customs services. Yet the EULEX mission is not in Kosovo to govern or 
rule. It is a technical mission which, in co-operation with the European Commission 
Assistance Programmes, will implement its mandate through monitoring, mentoring 
and advising (MMA) roles, while retaining certain executive powers and 
responsibilities. EULEX works under the general framework of UNSC Resolution 
1244/99 and has a unified chain of command to Brussels. EULEX assists the Kosovo 
judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards 
sustainability and accountability. It will further develop and strengthen an independent 
and multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-ethnic police and customs service, ensuring 
that these institutions are free from political interference and adhering to internationally 
recognised standards and European best practices.83 A previous report on prospective 
EU members had also observed that the Kosovo government has demonstrated 
commitment to Kosovo's European perspective, including through sustained efforts in 
areas such as visa and trade and the establishment of a National Council for EU 
Integration, with the Kosovo parliament passing the relevant legislation for launching 
key reforms. However, the report also noted that much more still needs to be done to 
tackle organised crime and corruption. Public administration is weak and the 
                                            
82 EULEX employs around 2,000 international and local staff and the annual budget is around 111 million 
Euros. 
83  Vedran Džihić and Helmut Kramer, ‘Kosovo After Independence: Is the EU’s EULEX Mission 
Delivering on its Promises?’, International Policy Analysis, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin (July, 2009) 
28pp. Accessible at: <http://www.fes.de/ipa> 
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implementation of judicial reform remains a challenge,84 although  Kosovo has 
apparently completed its vetting process of judges and prosecutors.85 
 
The ethnic composition of the local police forces and judicial authorities is an 
especially thorny issue in the northern parts of Kosovo where Serb-majority 
municipalities are situated. In this regard, the recent, 2013 First Agreement on 
Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia has provided, inter alia, as 
follows: 
‘7. There shall be one police force in Kosovo called the Kosovo Police (KP). All police 
in northern Kosovo shall be integrated in the Kosovo Police framework. Salaries will 
be only from the KP. 
8. Members of other Serbian security structures will be offered a place in equivalent 
Kosovo structures. 
9. There shall be a Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority 
municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic). The 
Commander of this region shall be a Kosovo Serb nominated by the Ministry of Interior 
from a list provided by the four mayors on behalf of the Community/Association. The 
composition of the KP (Kosovo Police) in the north will reflect the ethnic composition 
of the population of the four municipalities. (There will be another Regional 
Commander for the municipalities of Mitrovica South, Skenderaj and Vushtrri). The 
                                            
84 See: (EU) Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Brussels, 12.10.2011, COM(2011) 666 final, 
at p.17. 
85 Ibid., at 5. 
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regional commander of the four northern municipalities will cooperate with other 
regional commanders. 
10. The judicial authorities will be integrated and operate within the Kosovo legal 
framework. The Appellate Court in Pristina will establish a panel composed of a 
majority of K/S judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities. 
11. A division of this Appellate Court, composed both by administrative staff and 
judges will sit permanently in northern Mitrovica (Mitrovica District Court). Each panel 
of the above division will be composed by a majority of K/S judges. Appropriate judges 
will sit dependant on the nature of the case involved.’ 
 
Following-up these provisions in the ‘First Agreement’ between Kosovo and 
Serbia, the Implementation Plan agreed to establish separate working groups for the 
implementation of Articles 7-9 and Article 10. These  ‘Police’ working groups were 
tasked with developing detailed plans and agreed timelines for the integration of both 
Serbian security personnel and their judicial authorities into their corresponding 
Kosovo structures, both of these to be undertaken with the assistance of EULEX. The 
recent report by the Kosovo government to the EU on these issues states, inter alia, as 
follows: On policing issues, limited progress has been made, including limited progress 
on the integration of Serb police in the Kosovo police the appointment of an acting 
regional police director and the establishment of a directorate for the Mitrovica region 
by Kosovo, and closure of MUP offices by Serbia.86 However, the report also noted that 
                                            
86 See: Kosovo government report to the EU on the ‘State of Play in Implementation of the Brussels 
Agreements’ (2014), op. cit. at 5. 
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there was no progress on the closure of so-called ‘civil protection’ structures, a sort of 
Serb paramilitary structure which has operated in Kosovo since the end of the conflict 
in 1999. In spite of the Brussels Agreement calls for closure of all parallel security 
structures and, continuous requests by the Kosovo side to address this issue, the Serbian 
side has rejected any discussions about this.87 On judicial institutional issues, the 
Kosovo government report observed that progress has been made in that Serb parallel 
courts ceased to receive new cases, but no progress has been made in integrating Serb 
judges and prosecutors in the Kosovo judicial institutions. In December 2013, an 
important breakthrough towards a unitary justice system for Kosovo as a whole took 
place, whereby a single Basic Court and Basic Prosecution Office for the Mitrovica 
region, was established. On the other hand, the Kosovo government report noted that 
the integration of Serb judges and prosecutors in the Kosovo judicial institutions has 
not yet commenced, with further progress is being hampered by Serbian demands on 
the ethnic composition of these courts.88 
 
On the financial front, all the EU assistance to countries with prospects for EU 
membership – including ‘candidate countries’ such as Turkey and others in the Western 
Balkans region, as well as Kosovo as a ‘potential candidate’ – has been brought under 
the auspices of a single measure: the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).89 
                                            
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Council Regulation (EC) No.1085/2006 of 17 July, 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA). Kosovo is listed in Annex II to this Regulation. Article 6 (1) requires that assistance 
shall be provided on the basis of multi-annual indicative planning documents (MIPD), established in 
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The IPA came into force from the beginning of 2007. IPA is to provide nearly €11.5 
billion Euros to all the designated ‘candidate’ and ‘potential candidate’ countries over 
the period 2007-2013. Over a five year period (2007-2012), EU financial assistance to 
Kosovo directly amounted to €565.1 million Euros. The projects the IPA will support 
are geared to bringing candidates and potential candidates (such as Kosovo) into line 
with EU standards. (emphasis added) In particular, it will assist candidate countries to 
fully implement the EU legislation (collectively known as the ‘Community acquis’) at 
the time they become EU Member States. As the Commission notes, ‘(t)he acquis is 
the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states. 
It is constantly evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives 
of the (EU) Treaties; legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of 
the Court of Justice; declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; instruments 
under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; international agreements concluded 
by the Union and those entered into by the member states among themselves within the 
sphere of the Union's activities. Candidate countries for potential EU membership have 
to accept the acquis before they can join the EU and make EU law part of their own 
national legislation. Adoption and implementation of the acquis are the basis of the EU 
accession negotiations.’90 
 
                                            
close consultation with the national authorities. On 14 August 2008, the Commission adopted the MIPD 
2008-2010 for Kosovo. This was followed by a further Commission Decision of 2009 on an MIPD for 
2009-2011 for Kosovo. 
90 See ‘Acquis: European Commission - Enlargement – Acquis’, accessible from the EU Commission 
website at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en.htm 
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Potential candidates such as Kosovo are assisted to align themselves 
progressively with the EU legislation. These measures aimed at the progressive 
harmonization of standards within Pre-Accession States with prevailing EU standards 
assume a particular resonance for Kosovo. In this regard, progress towards both fully 
independent Statehood and membership of the European Union has arguably been 
enhanced by the recent 2013 Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, which provides, 
inter alia, in Article 14, as follows: ‘It is agreed that neither side will block, or 
encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.’ On 
this point, even the Serbian government led by Aleksander Vucic, a former nationalist 
whose Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won the Serbian national elections on 16 
March, 2014 by a clear majority, has espoused a pro-European policy since 2008.91 
 
International territorial administration is now an accepted technique for 
enforcing international legal obligations and, according to Stahn, ‘a means to 
implement international legal standards and further commonly defined community 
interests.’92 The previous UNSC/UNMIK strategy of pursuing ‘Standards before 
Status’93 on broader issues of democratic government has arguably been modified more 
                                            
91 See: ‘Serbia’s election: A zealot in power’, in The Economist, UK weekly news magazine, Vol.410, 
No.8879, 22-28 March, 2014, at 40. 
92 Carsten Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq 
and Beyond, Cambridge: CUP (2008) at 154. 
93 The Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan (KSIP) agreed between the Kosovo government and 
UNMIK adopted on 31 March, 2004 sets out the actions and policies to achieve the ‘Standards for 
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recently by the EULEX to one of ‘Standards and Status’, meaning that EU standards 
(including those for environmental protection) should be complied with as soon as 
possible, while negotiations continue on Kosovo’s status in the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, as Spernbauer observes presciently, the Community/Union acquis alignment 
strategy is designed to ultimately achieve a ‘standards beyond status’ goal, thus 
ensuring the approximation of domestic standards to that of the EU, whether or not 
Kosovo ever becomes a fully-fledged EU Member state.94  
 
Within this context, a further EU Commission Decision of 2009 had inter alia, 
identified environmental considerations as one of the major cross-cutting issues to be 
tackled in Kosovo, along with good governance, the provision of equal opportunities 
and the non discrimination of minority and vulnerable groups, as well as recognition of 
civil society organizations. All of these issues were duly reflected in IPA-financed 
activities during 2009-2011, in addition to specific actions dedicated to the 
environment, in particular as concerns environmental impact assessments. This is 
particularly relevant where there is potentially a high environmental impact, such as co-
financing of investments and new legislation.95 The EU’s Kosovo Progress Report for 
                                            
Kosovo’, published in Pristina on 10 December 2003 and subsequently endorsed by the UN Security 
Council on 12 December, 2003. Accessible at: http://www.unmikonline.org/standards/ 
94 Martina Spernbauer, ‘EULEX Kosovo: The Difficult Deployment and Challenging Implementation of 
the Most Comprehensive Civilian EU Operation to Date’, German Law Journal, Vol.11, No.8 (2010) 
769-802, at 788. 
95 See Annex 4: Cross-cutting issues, of EU Comm Decision (2009) on a Multi-Annual Indicative 
Planning Document (MIPD) Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244/99) 2009-2011, at 26. 
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2013,96 observed that, inter alia, alignment of Kosovo’s environment legislation has 
been limited to the adoption of the law on water and adoption of a number of 
administrative instructions on waste and industrial pollution. The 2014 Progress Report 
followed this by noting that ‘(o)verall, Kosovo has not progressed beyond the very 
initial stages of harmonisation with the acquis in these areas. There has been little 
progress on new legislation and implementing existing laws. Environment and climate 
need to become government priorities. The quality of environmental reporting needs to 
improve to better inform government policies.’97 More recently, the latest EU Progress 
Report for Kosovo (2015) concludes generally that: ‘Legislation to address increasing 
environmental challenges in Kosovo has not yet been fully harmonised with the acquis 
or implemented. As regards horizontal legislation, environmental impact assessments 
and strategic environmental assessments need to be better implemented, especially 
locally. Public participation and consultation need strengthening.’98  
                                            
96 Kosovo Progress Report 2013, ibid., at 39-40, accessible at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ks_rapport_2013.pdf 
97 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Kosovo 2014 Progress Report, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2014-2015, 
COM(2014) 700 final, Brussels, 8.10.2014 SWD(2014) 306 final, 58pp., at 42. Accessible at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-kosovo-progress-report_en.pdf 
98 European Commission, Staff Working Document, Kosovo 2015 Progress Report, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, on the EU Enlargement Strategy, Brussels, 10.11.2015 
SWD(2015) 215 final, 68pp, at 48. Accessible at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_kosovo.pdf 
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IV. Applying Transitional Environmental Justice in Kosovo 
A. Conceptual Prospects and Practical Examples 
Returning to the aim of this paper in emphasizing the achievement of transitional 
environmental justice as an alternative means to achieve overall transitional justice, the 
legal baseline for environmental protection consists of the commonly shared experience 
of all the different communities within Kosovo in their continuing enjoyment of the 
surrounding ‘natural’ environment in which they live and work. As Keinänen observes, 
environmental concerns are important even in Kosovo, not necessarily for the 
improvement of the physical state of the (natural) environment in and of itself but, ‘first 
and foremost, for the well-being of the local people.’99 How might the recasting of 
potentially divisive inter-community disputes as environmental, rather than as prevalent 
types of ethnic, social or religious issues, promote reconciliation in the current Kosovo 
situation? For Teitel, the re-construction of law and specifically the rule of law within 
a transitional society must be viewed through the lenses of at least three mediating 
concepts: 1) the social reconstruction of the rule of law as an intrinsic cultural aspect of 
the reconstruction of the transitional society itself; 2) the role of international law as a 
continuing and transcending presence within the domestic legal system as it is re-
shaped; and 3) the acceptance of the rule of law as a limit to politics,  especially the 
ethnically-based politicking that can so easily  
                                            
 
99 Katja Keinänen, ‘International Law and the Interests of Liberal Market Economy: The Non-Issue of 
Environmental Protection in the Kosovo International Administration’, Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 18, 2007 (2009) 9-31, at 12. 
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(re-)divide communities within a transitional society.100 Applying these mediating 
concepts to the Kosovo situation, it will be seen that the relatively strong, influential 
and continuing presence of the international community in Kosovo, especially in the 
form of the UN and more recently, the EU, has resulted in both the inclusion and 
putative application of relevant international human rights law and environmental 
principles within the Kosovo constitution and relevant domestic laws.  
 
However, the two other mediating concepts proposed by Teitel for enabling 
transitional justice, namely, the cultural establishment of the rule of law and its role as 
a final limit on inter-communal politicking in Kosovo are yet to be fully discerned.101 
This is especially pertinent in the case of the re-establishment, and perhaps more 
importantly, the re-legitimization, of an effective domestic (Kosovo) judicial system, 
which still has a long way to go. Chesterman has observed that Kosovo demonstrates 
some of the most difficult aspects of administering justice under international 
administration, arguing that a clearer distinction between an initial period of martial 
law (to deal with Kosovo Albanian reprisals against Serbs) and subsequent judicial 
reconstruction (ideally under the supervision of internationally-appointed judges) might 
have ameliorated some (though not all) of the problems.102 Within this context, much 
                                            
100 Teitel (2000) op. cit., 18-22. 
101 Stevens Report, ‘Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in 
Kosovo’, M.R.G. International (26 May, 2009) 
102 Simon Chesterman, Justice under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, 
International Peace Academy Report, Project on Transitional Administrations (September, 2002) 16pp., 
at 5-6. Accessible at: 
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of what is needed has to do with changing the psychology of the judges and other 
important government officials involved in the Kosovo legal system through re-training 
and professional development.103 In this regard, the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) is 
now operational and its capacity to develop institutional competence will continue to 
be subject of Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA) actions by the EULEX. The 
KJC has a pivotal role in ensuring the independence and efficiency of the judicial 
system. It is a fully independent institution that seeks to ensure the independency of the 
courts, their professional and impartial role, and fully reflect the multi-ethnic nature of 
Kosovo following the principles of gender equality.104 Also imperative is the provision 
of significant capital investment to improve the physical conditions under which the 
judges and lawyers work. As de Greiff has observed, ‘(transitional) justice practitioners 
… must also face tough questions about the costs of implementing justice, particularly 
in contexts characterized by chronic scarcity.’105  
 
The value of re-conceptualizing otherwise intransigent social, cultural, religious 
and/or ethnic conflicts within a society in transition as environmental disputes is 
                                            
http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/Resources/2002/IPA%20-%20JUSTICE_UNDER_INTL.pdf 
103 See, for example, the EULEX Programme Report 2010, which highlights the continuing deficiencies 
of Kosovo courts in this respect. Accessible at: http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/docs/tracking/EULEX%20Programme%20Report%202010%20.pdf 
104 EULEX Programme Report 2010, ibid., at 25. 
105 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Articulating the Links Between Transitional Justice and Development: Justice and 
Social Integration’, in de Greiff & Duthie (eds) Transitional Justice and Development: Making the 
Connections (2009) 28-75, at 30. 
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highlighted in the following examples from Kosovo.106 Under the Ahtisaari Plan for the 
social reconstruction of post-conflict Kosovo, Orthodox churches and monastery sites 
are protected as they are deemed to be an intrinsic element of the (minority) ethnic 
Serbian community in Kosovo.107 The Kosovo Progress Report 2013 paints a generally 
positive picture of continuing efforts to ensure their security and safety, noting that only 
the Visoki Dečani Monastery remains under KFOR protection and that protection of 
the Peć Patriarchate was has been transferred from KFOR to Kosovo police. 
Nevertheless, petty theft and vandalism incidents involving Orthodox churches and 
Muslim cemeteries, as well as the periodic widespread desecration of Orthodox 
cemeteries, reveal the vulnerability of sites of value to the Serbian community in 
Kosovo during times of political strain.108  
 
                                            
106 The examples relied upon here are based on actual situations within Kosovo that have been 
anonymized due to confidential nature of the OSCE internal reports from which the facts of these cases 
are drawn from. 
107 The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, also known as the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’ 
op. cit., contains proposals of detailed measures aiming at: (a) ensuring the promotion and protection of 
the rights of communities and their members (with special attention to the protection of Serb minorities); 
(b) the effective decentralization of government and public administration (so as to encourage public 
participation); (c) the preservation and protection of cultural and religious heritage. The ultimate goal is 
the formation and consolidation of a multi-ethnic democratic society, under the rule of law, with the 
prevalence of the fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination, the exercise of the right of 
participation in public life, and of the right of equal access to justice by everyone. See especially, ‘Annex 
V: Religious and Cultural Heritage’ of the Ahtisaari Plan.  
108 Kosovo Progress Report 2013, op. cit., at 15. 
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Until recently (with the changes introduced to the composition of the Kosovo 
police force by the 2013 Agreement), the lack of Serb representation within the K-
Albanian dominated Kosovo police force also contributed to the sense of 
disengagement and alienation felt by the Serbian community. As Mertus notes, ‘(T)he 
confidence of minority groups plummets as assaults directed against the Serbian 
Orthodox community continue and the (Kosovo) police fail to offer protection. ... 
Successful prosecutions for attacks on religious minorities are rare in Kosova. Weak 
administrative and judicial systems compound the problem, posing major obstacles to 
the realisation of the rights of religious minorities.’109 
 
A further source of friction is caused when the (mainly) Kosovo-Albanian 
controlled municipal authorities have licensed the establishment of business enterprises 
and other commercial activities in the surrounding areas immediately beyond the 
grounds of these protected religious sites.110 These activities are (mainly) owned and 
operated by members of the K-Albanian community and mostly consist of light and 
medium-sized industries, agri-business enterprises and farming concerns. Disputes 
have arisen over allegations that these activities are impinging on the sanctity of 
protected Orthodox religious sites, especially the need for minimum interference to 
their activities of worship, meditation and prayer. On the face of it, this type of dispute 
                                            
109 Mertus (2012) op. cit., at 242, citing US State Department, ‘Kosovo, international religious freedom 
report 2009’, filed on 26 October, 2009 at: 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127318.htm. 
110 Under the Ahtisaari Plan ibid., such activities would in all probability either be proscribed or restricted 
under (Paragraph) 4.1.1. 
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has all the hallmarks of a classical inter-ethnic/religious confrontation: An important 
aspect of ethnic Serbian (religious) culture is being subjected to intolerable interference 
by activities undertaken by K-Albanians and permitted by K-Albanian-controlled 
municipal councils, on adjacent properties to previously sacrosanct Orthodox Christian 
sites. Vice versa, the K-Albanian community could/would argue that the Orthodox 
church and Serbian community demands for an extended area of sanctuary, arguably 
going beyond the actual boundaries of the religious sites established under the Ahtisaari 
plan constitutes an unacceptable imposition on the regulatory autonomy and 
jurisdiction of the municipal authorities. For K-Albanians this issue goes beyond simply 
ensuring sensitivity for places of worship and religious tolerance generally. It harks 
back to the period prior to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which they would 
characterize as a time of abject subjugation of their community/race to the Serbian 
community, supported by the (then) Serbian-dominated federal government of 
Yugoslavia and exemplified by the presence of Orthodox church icons found in many 
parts of Kosovo.  
 
How can this apparently intractable situation be resolved? The suggestion here 
is that a closer examination of the types of interferences alleged by the Orthodox church 
as impinging on the sanctity of its protected sites can be re-cast as an environmental, 
rather than inter-ethnic/religious, issue. Thus, what is being objected to here by the 
Orthodox church is simply the fact that the activities permitted by the municipal 
authorities constitute an environmental nuisance due to the noise pollution or toxic 
fumes generated by these activities. As we shall see below, these claims can be 
substantiated by reference to legal developments in the jurisprudence of the European 
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) when interpreting and applying the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 1950.111 The 2008 Kosovo constitution now provides 
for the direct application of, inter alia, the ECHR within the domestic, Kosovo legal 
system, and moreover, requires that the human rights guaranteed by this Constitution 
shall be interpreted consistently with the court decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights.112 The application of a legal standard of protection against serious 
environmental interferences currently being developed through the Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisprudence on Article 8 of the ECHR is especially pertinent to the type of dispute 
that is prevalent in Kosovo today. This jurisprudential development is both in line with, 
and reflecting of, wider developments in favour of procedural environmental rights 
within international environmental law, which are also being implemented within the 
EU legal system. 
 
The transformative element of the re-classification of this type of dispute from 
‘ethnic/religious’ to ‘environmental’ bears further scrutiny, if only because of its 
potential to render legal protection on an arguably more value-neutral, and thereby non-
discriminatory, basis. As Mertus observes presciently, ‘Kosova is not a case of 
institutional malfunction or failure. Rather, it is a case of not creating institutions that 
all residents use uniformly.’113 Similar legal arguments can be made in the context of 
                                            
111 Both the Convention texts and case law of the Strasbourg Court are accessible from the ECHR website 
at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home 
112 See Articles 22 and 53, respectively, of the 2008 Kosovo Constitution. 
113 Mertus (2012) op. cit. at 242. 
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several local authority-permitted excavations being performed on private properties, 
which allegedly may result in damage to important archaeological sites proposed for 
protection by the relevant bodies involved. Close to yet another historic (castle) site, a 
mining company has received authorization by the local municipality to begin 
conducting explosions, which might negatively affect this historic site. Again, the issue 
is really one of assessing and if necessary regulating the potential environmental 
impacts of such permitted activities, rather than viewing these activities simply as 
examples of the unequal treatment of cultural artefacts belonging to the minority (Serb) 
community due to the political dominance of the majority (Kosovo Albanian) 
community represented in these permitting local authorities. As we will see below, both 
the prior assessment and regulation of such inherently dangerous activities for the 
surrounding environment is now amply provided for within applicable domestic, 
Kosovo environmental laws, which are themselves based on well-known and accepted 
international environmental principles and standards. 
 
Finally, another dispute involving the Orthodox church, but one that represents 
a neat reversal of the victim-perpetrator roles in the previous disputes noted above, is 
the construction and maintenance of perimeter walls around the periphery of certain 
Orthodox church sites, as well as new wings to monasteries.114 The construction of 
these walls and additional buildings is objected to by the mainly K-Albanian 
neighborhoods surrounding these church/monastery sites. Here, the non-discrimination 
                                            
114 For example, the construction of a new wing to the Visoki Decani monastery, see: ‘Kosovo and Serbia: 
A little local difficulty’, The Economist (UK) news magazine, August 6-12, 2011, at 31.     
 59 
principle underlying the objective application of environmental protection standards in 
the form of minimum (pollution) threshold levels for noise and dust, for example, can 
just as easily be applied against the Orthodox church as in its favour in the previous 
case (above). This last example can be put forward against the view that favouring 
environmental concerns/sensitivity issues over underlying and continuing ethnic/social 
discord is merely a smokescreen for a positive discrimination policy in favour of 
minority communities and implicitly against the majority community. Without needing 
to pronounce on either the value or legitimacy of pursuing positive discrimination 
policies for minority communities, we can see that the neutral/objective application of 
relevant environmental standards cuts both ways in terms of the protection afforded by 
these standards being enforceable against any activities that allegedly are in breach of 
them, regardless of the ethnic identity of the perpetrators involved.  
 
It should also be noted that ECHR Article 8 rights do not depend on property 
ownership. On this basis, residents of ‘temporary’ refugee camps (which are prevalent 
in the northern part of Kosovo) mainly populated by another minority community – the 
Roma – can arguably also complain against environmental interferences to their 
privacy, family life and homes, even when these are temporary accommodations.115 
                                            
115 Since the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, exposure to lead contamination among the displaced 
Roma community currently still living in camps in northern Mitrovica is one of the biggest medical crises 
in the region, according to a Background Report on ‘Lead contamination in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
affecting the Roma community’, prepared for the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (February 2009) Accessible 
at: 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/36234?download=true 
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While they are apparently unable to apply directly to the Strasbourg court due to formal 
uncertainty surrounding Kosovo’s international legal status,116 they will be able to make 
such claims before local courts as the ECHR and the Strasbourg court jurisprudencenow 
forms part of domestically applicable Kosovo law, as provided within the 2008 Kosovo 
constitution. (See further below, in Part IV) 
 
B. Transitional Environmental Justice as a Constraining Factor in Kosovo’s 
Economic Reconstruction 
Moving from our initial arguments re-casting certain ethnic/social conflicts as 
transitional environmental justice issues, at least one further way in which arguments 
for environmental justice can gain entry into the transitional justice camp is by latching 
on to the ongoing debate as to whether the goals of transitional justice should expressly 
include the socio-economic reconstruction of a society in transition, in addition to the 
more well-known aims of transitional justice. Here, there can be little doubt that the 
international institutional agenda for transitional justice now explicitly takes on board 
                                            
116 On 20 February 2006, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) - an international public interest 
law organisation working to combat anti-Romani racism and human rights abuse of Roma - filed an 
application with the European Court of Human Rights on behalf of 184 Romani residents of camps for 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in northern Kosovo. On 21 February 2006, the Court faxed a letter 
to the ERRC declining to review the case stating that it did not have jurisdiction to do so. Specifically, 
the Court claimed it was not competent to review the case since the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) is not party to the Convention. See: ‘European Court of Human Rights Has No Jurisdiction in 
Kosovo Lead Poisoning Case’, 3 April 2006, accessible from ERRC website at: 
http://www.errc.org/article/european-court-of-human-rights-has-no-jurisdiction-in-kosovo-lead-
poisoning-case/2568 
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socio-economic reconstruction/development as a vital element in the pursuit of 
transitional justice.117 Already in 2001, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan had 
proposed moving away from the reactive mentalities and practices adopted during the 
Cold War and toward a ‘culture of prevention’ that requires ‘the deep-rooted 
socioeconomic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that 
often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts’ to be addressed. 
(emphasis added) This approach incorporates short and long-term methods that 
encompass political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, 
institutional and other measures by the international community, in cooperation with 
local actors. In this way, he argued, ‘conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable 
development are mutually reinforcing activities.’118  
 
Core transitional justice proponents have perhaps understandably been slow to 
embrace this scope-widening exercise that potentially leads the transitional justice 
debate into troubled waters, preferring instead to stay within the relatively calm waters 
of traditional transitional justice concerns such as, inter alia, fact-finding, establishing 
personal and collective accountability and responsibility for past atrocities, reparations 
                                            
117 UN Secretary-General’s Report (2004) op. cit. Also: Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (eds) 
Transitional Justice and Development: Making Connections, International Center for Transitional 
Justice, Social Science Research Council, New York (2009), Graciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn 
States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(2008) and the IJTJ Special Issue on ‘Transitional Justice and Development’, Vol.2, No.3 (2008). 
118 Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574 (7 
June 2001) at para.11. 
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and reconciliation. These doctrinal notions of the scope of activities (and their attendant 
legal regimes) that transitional justice should entail have come under criticism due to 
their perceived exclusionary effects for other equally significant issues and actors in 
transitional societies. Nagy has noted that transitional justice is typically constructed to 
focus on specific sets of actors for specific sets of crimes. She argues that this results in 
a fairly narrow interpretation of violence within a somewhat artificial time frame and 
to the exclusion of external actors.119 There is growing evidence of late that even die-
hard transitional justice practitioners are uncovering latent and underlying socio-
economic, as well as racial, religious, and political roots for ethnic and social conflicts 
within States, leading them to re-examine the role of ‘development’ in relation to 
transitional justice. Mani highlights four areas of inquiry that both transitional justice 
and development specialists must consider if either field is to achieve its intended goals. 
Two of these questions are pertinent here: First, can transitional justice afford not to 
concern itself directly with social injustice and patterns of inequality, discrimination 
and marginalization that were underlying causes of a conflict and that inflicted major 
suffering and victimization on vast swathes of a population? How can (or should) 
transitional justice have a more direct impact on reducing social and economic 
inequality? Second, does transitional justice represent a trade-off of sorts between 
justice or development, rather than promoting development with justice? Mani is of the 
                                            
119 Rosemary Nagy, ‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’, Third World Quarterly, 
Volume 29, Issue 2 (March, 2008) 275 – 289. 
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view that transitional justice will lose credibility if its scholars and practitioners do not 
address these questions within the (usually) impoverished societies they operate in.120 
 
 Thus, even if transitional justice should never be thought of as simply being part 
of a wider, socio-economic (re-)development strategy, transitional justice should be, at 
a minimum, ‘development sensitive’.121 A development-sensitive approach would 
require transitional justice practitioners to be aware of the different links that may exist 
between transitional justice and development, and to consider pursuing synergies with 
development work and directly addressing development-related issues. Duthie proposes 
four levels at which this relationship exists: transitional justice and development efforts 
can complement each other; inadvertently affect each other; be coordinated in order to 
generate positive synergies; and directly address each other. He therefore argues that 
transitional justice measures should be designed and implemented in ways that are 
‘development sensitive.’122 Pasipanodya however goes further, arguing that in places 
like Nepal transitional justice mechanisms should not continue to neglect economic and 
social justice issues when it was injustice on these fronts that was both a root and a 
product of conflict.123 Powell echoes this sentiment from a South African perspective, 
                                            
120 Rama Mani, ‘Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between Transitional 
Justice and Development’, IJTJ (2008) 2(3): 253-265, at 253-254. 
121 Roger Duthie, ‘Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice’, IJTJ (2008) 2 
(3): 292-309. 
122 Duthie (2008) ibid., at 309. 
123 Tafadzwa Pasipanodya, ‘A Deeper Justice: Economic and Social Justice as Transitional Justice in 
Nepal’, IJTJ (2008) 2(3): 378-397. 
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holding that early conceptions of justice in transition which tried to exclude: 1) socio-
economic injustice from its list of actionable wrongs; and 2) redistributive justice from 
the valid aims of democratic transition, would neither be able to explain nor redress the 
problems of racial injustice or political transition in South Africa.124 In this regard, 
Miller highlights three areas of general concern, namely, (1) the economic roots and 
consequences of the conflict that transitional justice institutions seek to narrate, 
prosecute and overcome; (2) the economic liberalization that accompanies political 
transition in many transitional contexts, often constituting a lack of significant socio-
economic redistribution of resources in the post-conflict state; and (3) the connected 
development plans of the new government for the future.125 
 
 Transitional justice mechanisms must therefore be part of a broader set of 
policies for socio-economic development and reconciliation, with sustainable human 
development principles underlying many of the objectives of these transitional justice 
mechanisms.126  However, the form, implementation and outcome of such mechanisms 
are influenced primarily by the political will, capacity and resources available to local, 
national and international institutions.127 These mechanisms tend to neglect the active 
                                            
124 Derek Powell, ‘The Role of Constitution Making and Institution Building in Furthering Peace, Justice 
and Development: South Africa’s Democratic Transition’, IJTJ, Vol.4 (2010) 230-250, at 231. 
125 Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice, IJTJ, 
(2008) 2(3): 266-291, at 267. 
126 Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham, ‘Ownership and Participation in Transitional Justice Mechanisms: 
A Sustainable Human Development Perspective from Eastern DRC’, IJTJ (2008) 2(3): 398-411. 
127 Ibid., at 410. 
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involvement of the affected population in the planning and implementation phases of 
socio-economic development. The implicit danger is of the negative consequences of 
uneven socio-economic reconstruction as a result of the unconditional inclusion of 
simplistic notions of ‘development’ within the goals/objectives of a transitional society. 
Laplante highlights grass roots level conflict world-wide that is based on growing socio-
economic disparities within communities, rather than the more usual forms of ethnic, 
religious and/or political divisions found in transitional societies.128 Significantly, she 
includes environmental pollution caused by extractive industries within the notion of 
socioeconomic grievances.129 Finally, Castillo explicitly links post-conflict socio-
economic reconstruction with the need to establish appropriate legal and institutional 
frameworks providing for market-oriented but broad-based economic growth, which 
she defines as ‘growth that is sustainable, creates employment, brings about poverty 
alleviation and greater opportunity for the majority, and protects the environment.’130 
She makes the further point that this type of sustainable economic growth is 
‘particularly important in post-conflict countries, where economic reconstruction must 
contribute to national reconciliation.’131 (emphasis added)  
 
 All of these prescriptions clearly apply to present day Kosovo. The negative 
effects of unmitigated pursuit of economic growth are especially detrimental from an 
                                            
128 Lisa J. Laplante, ‘Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the 
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework’, IJTJ Vol. 2 (2008) 331–355. 
129 Laplante (2008) ibid., at 332. 
130 Castillo (2008) op. cit., 224-225. 
131 Ibid, at 225. 
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environmental perspective. As Keinänen has noted, environmental protection has so far 
been a ‘non-issue’ in the international administration of Kosovo, its foundational role 
for a stable society and competitive economy ignored because of complex and 
overarching issues involving disputed property ownership, poor resource management, 
and a lack of protection of basic human rights.132 Thus, we can see the potential for the 
introduction of environmental justice mechanisms to constrain potentially unequal 
economic development between communities in ways that may ultimately be 
detrimental to the achievement of overall transitional justice within a still relatively 
vulnerable polity. Within this context, it should be unsurprising that principles and tools 
for environmental justice are now prescribed by international environmental law and 
increasingly, international development law, especially as an important aspect of 
international finance, technical and technology assistance rendered by and through both 
public and private IFIs.133 Unlike other transitional States such as East Timor or 
Cambodia, for example, Kosovo also benefits in this regard from its institutional links 
with the EU, especially through its Pre-Accession status.   
 
 A further argument for the explicit inclusion of environmental considerations 
and criteria within the otherwise prioritized economic reconstruction of Kosovo is the 
acknowledged universality of baseline human environmental needs, as compared with 
more contested notions of (re-)distributive socio-economic justice within this 
                                            
132 Keinänen (2009) op. cit., at 12-13. 
133 See, for example, the Equator Principles for social and environmental impact assessment and 
mitigation that are voluntarily accepted by Project Finance providing banks. Accessible at:  
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ethnically-divided transitional society. Measures to promote a liberal market economy 
can be politically controversial in ex-socialist model economies and then founder on 
wealth re-distribution goals, thereby entrenching already prevalent socio-economic 
inequalities. On the other hand, basic human requirements for clean water, air and 
uncontaminated soil, as well as sufficient and untainted food supplies, have been 
elevated by the human rights and development communities to that of imperative goals 
when tackling poverty in less developed countries, whether transitional or not.  
 
For example, the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) include 
ensuring environmental sustainability as Goal No.7, alongside inter alia the eradication 
of poverty and hunger (Goal No.1) of the eight MDGs that according the UN 
Development Programme ‘provide a framework for the entire international community 
to work together towards a common end – making sure that human development 
reaches everyone, everywhere.’134 Securing such basic environmental needs for the 
entire population of Kosovo should therefore be an unchallengeable proposition as a 
basis for the introduction of transitional environmental justice mechanisms. Replacing 
the MDGs in 2015, the UN-sponsored Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)135 
combining economic development, environmental sustainability and social 
                                            
134 See: ‘What are the Millennium Development Goals?’, accessed at the UNDP MDG website: 
http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml 
135 See: ‘Sustainable Development Goals: 17 Goals to Transform Our World’, accessible at: 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/  
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inclusion,136 represent an even more pertinent set of aims for Kosovo’s post-conflict, 
socio-economic reconstruction that includes environmental protection for its entire 
population. 
 
A significant national (as opposed to local) example of the possible utilization 
of environmental justice tools to constrain otherwise unrestrained development 
initiatives can be seen in respect of central government decisions on the location of the 
route for a highway project running across Kosovo territory. In this regard,  Kosovo is 
participating in the implementation of the 2004 Memorandum of Understanding on 
development of the South-East Europe Core Regional Transport Network,137 beginning 
from the Albanian port of Durres on the Adriatic coast, through the middle of Kosovo 
to the frontier region with Serbia, linking-up with the Trans-European Network 
Corridor X in Serbia.138 This transport infrastructure networking project is vital for 
improved communications between the land-locked, Balkan territories of Serbia and 
Kosovo, and the Mediterranean Sea. It is a major artery for international trade and 
investment to and from Kosovo. In line with this plan, the successful completion of 
                                            
136 Jeffrey D Sachs, ‘From Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals’, Lancet, 
Vol.379 (June 9, 2012) 2206–11, at 2206. 
137 Adopted by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, the 
European Commission on behalf of the EU, and, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(acting for the Provisional Institutions of Self Government) in Luxembourg, on 11 June 2004. Accessible 
at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/ten/infrastructure/doc/2004_06_11_memorandum.pdf 
138 Para.3.11 of the World Bank’s Kosovo Report (2010) op. cit., at 40-41. 
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Route 7 Motorway 63.4-mile (102-kilometer) dual-carriage highway through Kosovo 
extending from Morinë, at the southwest border with Albania, to the north of Kosovo’s 
capital, Pristina was announced in 2013. Route 7 now serves as the centerpiece of the 
Kosovo road transport system, helping to promote trade and economic development 
both within Kosovo and throughout the region as the trade route contributes to the 
economic integration of the countries of southeastern Europe, Western Europe, and 
beyond. The motorway traverses mountainous terrain and has 11 bridges, four 
interchanges and 22 overpasses and underpasses.139  
 
However, several issues had arisen during the planning stage of this project. 
Notably, the construction of an initial section of this highway project within Kosovo 
known as ‘Vermice-Merdare’ sector of the overall Route 7 Motorway,140 was 
controversial for a variety of reasons ranging, inter alia, from the lack of transparency 
over the initial Kosovo central government decision-making process to award the 
contractual tender for this project, to the location of an initial section of the highway in 
very close proximity to at least one ethnic Serbian community, and the apparent lack of 
a complete environmental impact assessment (EIA) prior to the commencement of 
works on this highway, at least in terms of the requirement for the consultation of local 
communities.141 For example, a recent study by a local civil society organization on a 
                                            
139 See: ‘Kosovo Motorway: Highway to the future’, in Bechtel (USA) website, accessible at: 
http://www.bechtel.com/projects/kosovo-motorway/ 
140 Kosovo Progress Report, 2013, op. cit., at 40. 
141 Article 27(2) of the Kosovo Law on EIA, provides for ‘Information and Public Participation’ as 
follows: ‘Concerned parties and the public shall participate in all phases of the EIA procedure, including 
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related Kosovo highway project, namely, Route 6 between Skopje and Pristina, has 
noted in a section entitled: ‘Lessons Learned from the Route 7 Construction’ that before 
the signing of the contract for “Route 7” construction, there was insufficient public 
discussion related to that (Route 7) project, nor had there been any feasibility study had 
been conducted.142  
 
Local (Serbian) politicians have also highlighted the lack of meaningful 
consultation with their representative communities over the routeing decisions taken by 
central Kosovo government ministries involved. They present this issue as yet another 
example of the discrimination experienced by their minority community at the hands of 
the (Albanian) majority community-led central government. Within this context, it is at 
least arguable that the proper implementation of applicable EIA requirements under 
                                            
decision taken process.’ More localized EIA exercises will apparently now be conducted immediately 
prior to each individual section of the highway project that will be worked on, according to a Kosovo 
Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning notification.  Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning, Environmental Decision Approval for the project ‘Construction of the Road 7 (highway) 
Vermice-Merdar’, Nr. 672/10/1 – ZSP-116/10, dated: 23.04.2010. (Unofficial translation provided by 
Nadia Jurzac, OSCE Kosovo, Property Section.) However, this did not prevent the dislocating effects 
experienced by the Serbian community most directly affected by the initial routing decisions for the 
highway section passing very close to their homes and in some cases, dividing their farm lands. 
142 See: ‘Route 6 Highway: Prishtina-Skopje’, Study/report by the Institute for Development Research 
(RIINVEST) for the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), Kosovo: Pristina (2015) 39pp, at 13. 
(Originally written in Albanian) Accessible at: http://kfos.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/8.-AUTO-
ROUTE-6-HIGHWAY-PRISHTINA-SKOPE.pdf 
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Kosovo law would have ensured that both minority (Serbian) and indeed, even majority 
(Albanian) communities whose properties also border the highway project site, were all 
subject to prior consultation and participation in the decision-making process on the 
proposed highway route. Thus, achieving environmental justice for all the affected 
communities, especially on a non-discriminatory basis between the majority and 
minority ethnic communities, would have gone a long way towards reducing the rising 
communal tensions over this project. Moreover, it would have allowed all the affected 
communities to focus on the economic development opportunities presented by the 
highway, a fact that all the communities involved - majority and minority - accept as a 
positive outcome of this infrastructure project. This was therefore a lost early 
opportunity for social reconciliation coalescing around a well-defined economic 
development goal and facilitated by the application of non-discriminatory principles 
providing for procedural environmental rights. 
 
From the above case studies/examples, we can surmise at least two possible 
justifications for the inclusion of environmental justice as a further aspect or element in 
the overall conceptual make-up of transitional justice generally, such that the promotion 
of transitional environmental justice becomes a legitimate objective in and of itself, to 
ensure not merely the achievement of transitional justice in the longer term but also on 
an environmentally sustainable basis. These justifications for engaging with the 
notional premise of transitional environmental justice are as follows: First, as a means 
for the re-conceptualizing or re-casting otherwise intractable social/ethnic conflicts in 
a transitional society as ‘environmental’ disputes that are more susceptible to 
reconciliation on the basis of the application of environmental principles, notably 
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procedural environmental rights, in a neutral and non-discriminatory fashion. Second, 
as a means of tempering the excesses of full-blown efforts towards economic 
reconstruction/ development that threaten to re-trench and ultimately renew the deep 
social/ethnic divisions that may still persist within a particular transitional society. 
 
V. Pathways to Environmental Justice within the Kosovo Constitutional and Legal 
Framework 
The specific provision for environmental principles and procedural rights for achieving 
environmental justice will now be highlighted and assessed within the current Kosovo 
constitutional and legal framework. To begin with, as noted above, Articles 22 and 53 
of the 2008 Kosovo Constitution provide for the direct application of ECHR provisions 
and moreover, as these rights and freedoms are interpreted by European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence. Article 22 on the ‘Direct Applicability of 
International Agreements and Instruments’ provides as follows: ‘Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the following international agreements and 
instruments are guaranteed by this Constitution, are directly applicable in the Republic 
of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other 
acts of public institutions.’ These include, inter alia, (1) Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; and the (2) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols.  
 
Article 53 on the ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions’ then establishes 
that: ‘Human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be 
interpreted consistent with the court decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.’ 
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Significantly, this provision goes much further than what is provided in the Ahtisaari 
Plan itself, which in Article 2.1 on ‘Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ simply 
provides that Kosovo shall promote, protect and respect the highest level of 
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including, inter 
alia, the ECHR but without any specific allusion to the progressive developments in 
the interpretation of the Conventional rights and freedoms by Strasbourg Court in the 
intervening years since its establishment. Article 52 of the Kosovo Constitution on 
‘Responsibility for the Environment’ then provides for responsibility for nature and 
biodiversity protection, as well as the first and second pillars of 1998 Aarhus 
Convention,143 namely, the right to be informed and participate on environmental 
issues, and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) principle. 
 
Apart from the substantive provision of these important environmental 
principles and the procedural environmental rights derived from them, an equally 
significant structural aspect of the still fledgling Kosovo legal system is the presence of 
international judges in the Kosovo Constitutional Court to assist in the adjudication of 
legal issues that raise questions of interpretation of the ECHR in relation to Kosovo 
laws. The appointment and role of these international judges is provided by Kosovo 
Constitution as well as the Ahtisaari Plan. Article 152 of the Constitution on the 
                                            
143 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted: 25 June 1998, 
entered into force: 30 October, 2001. Currently, 44 States Parties. Serbia acceded to this Convention on 
31 July, 2009. Text accessible at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.htm 
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‘Temporary Composition of the Constitutional Court’ provides that: ‘Until the end of 
the international supervision of the implementation of the Comprehensive Proposal for 
Kosovo Status Settlement, dated 26 March 2007, the Constitutional Court shall be 
composed as follows: 1. Six (6) out of nine (9) judges shall be appointed by the 
President of the Republic of Kosovo on the proposal of the Assembly. … 4. Three (3) 
international judges shall be appointed by the International Civilian Representative, 
upon consultation with the President of the European Court of Human Rights. The three 
(3) international judges shall not be citizens of Kosovo or any neighboring country.’  
 
The presence of EULEX-appointed judges and prosecutors within the Kosovo 
jurisdiction is also established under a Kosovo Assembly Law.144 Article 1 of this Law 
‘regulates the integration and jurisdiction of the EULEX judges and prosecutors in the 
judicial and prosecutorial system of the Republic of Kosovo.’ On the basis of this 
legislation, Spernbauer notes that, ‘European judges and prosecutors become an 
integral part of the Kosovo judicial and prosecutorial system at the level of the Supreme 
Court and the district courts with executive authority in both civil and criminal law 
where they either exercise compulsory or optional jurisdiction.’145 Exceptionally, 
EULEX district court judges can also have jurisdiction for cases dealt with at municipal 
court level if the President of the Assembly of EULEX judges decides to assign such a 
case to EULEX in accordance with the modalities on case selection and case 
                                            
144 ‘Law on the jurisdiction, case selection and case allocation of EULEX judges and prosecutors in 
Kosovo’, Law No. 03/L-053, available at www.eulex-kosovo.eu. 
145 Spernbauer (2010) op. cit., at 791. 
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allocation.146 This institutional development may have positive implications for the 
possible application of European environmental standards within Kosovo, whether 
these are derived from the ECtHR jurisprudence already alluded to and elaborated 
below, or relevant EU environmental law principles and standards that may be regarded 
as being part of the Community/Union acquis that the Kosovo government has agreed 
to strive towards under the EU Pre-Accession process. 
 
The relevant provisions of the ECHR for environmental issues are as follows: 
ECHR Article 2 on the right to life; Article 8 on the right to respect for private and 
family life; and Article 1 of Protocol I on protection of property, the right to life and a 
home; and possessions, respectively. Of these provisions, the most significant is Article 
8, which provides four categories of rights, namely, privacy, family life, home and 
correspondence, and has been interpreted according to relevant  ECtHR jurisprudence 
to include prevention from (serious) environmental interferences.147 As the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR observed in the Hatton v the UK case,148 involving alleged noise 
pollution from night-time flights over Heathrow airport, there is no explicit right in the 
Convention to a clean and quiet environment, but where an individual is directly and 
seriously affected by noise or other forms of pollution, an issue may arise under Article 
8. Previously, in Powell and Rayner v the UK, where the applicants had complained 
                                            
146 See Article 3.4 and 5 of Law No.03/L-053. 
147 Loukis Loucaides, ‘Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, British Year Book of International Law (BYbIL), Vol.75, 2004, Oxford: OUP (2005) 
249-267. 
148 Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, ECHR 2003-VIII  (8.7.03) at para.96. 
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about disturbance from daytime aircraft noise, the Court held that Article 8 was 
relevant, since ‘the quality of [each] applicant's private life and the scope for enjoying 
the amenities of his home [had] been adversely affected by the noise generated by 
aircraft using Heathrow Airport.’149 Similarly, in López Ostra v Spain the Court held 
that Article 8 could include a right to protection from severe environmental pollution, 
since such a problem might ‘affect individuals' well-being and prevent them from 
enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, 
without, however, seriously endangering their health’.150 In Guerra and Others v Italy, 
which, like López Ostra, concerned environmental pollution, the Court observed that 
‘[the] direct effect of the toxic emissions on the applicants' right to respect for their 
private and family life means that Article 8 is applicable.’151 One of the more significant 
cases in this line of ECtHR Judgments is Fadeyeva v. Russia,152 where the Court 
accepted the applicant’s claim that her prolonged exposure to excessive pollution levels 
from a nearby steel plant had ‘adversely affected the quality of life at her home’ and 
therefore, that ‘the actual detriment to the applicant’s health and well-being reached a 
level sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.’153  
 
                                            
149 ECtHR Judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 18, at para.40. 
150 ECtHR Judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-C, pp. 54-55, para.51. 
151 ECtHR Judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, p. 227, at para.57. 
152 Fadeyeva v. Russia, European Court of Human Rights, App. No.55723/00, Judgment of 9 June 2005, 
published on 30 November, 2005. 
153 Fadeyeva v. Russia, ECHR (2005) ibid., at para.88. 
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These (and other) ECtHR judgments have expanded the application of Article 
8 to cover environmental interferences that can cause serious health problems.154 
Moreover, it is possible to suggest that an ECtHR finding of a breach of the legal 
standard of protection under Article 8 is at least partly based on whether the applicant 
had been able to inform themselves sufficiently about the environmental health risks 
involved, participate in the decision-making process, and challenge any decision on the 
legal authorization of the hazardous activity concerned. This was the case in Taşkin v. 
Turkey, where the Strasbourg court considered that, by failing to take into account the 
results of a public consultation and environmental impact assessment (EIA) exercise 
which had been previously endorsed by a Turkish court,155 the Turkish authorities had 
‘deprived the procedural guarantees available to the applicants of any useful effect,’156 
when they secretly authorised the continued operation of a gold mine. Turkey had thus 
failed to discharge its obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to guarantee the 
applicants' right to respect for their private and family life. 
 
This line of ECHR case law bears close resemblance to the development of 
procedural environmental rights now well-established within international and regional 
                                            
154 This line of ECtHR Judgments has been confirmed by, inter alia, the following cases: Giacomelli v 
Italy, Judgment of 2 November, 2006. Case No.59909/00; Tatar v Romania, Judgment of 27 January, 
2009. Application no.67021/01; and Băcilă v. Romania, Judgment of 30 March, 2010. Application 
no.19234/04. All accessible at: <http://www.echr.coe.int> 
155 Taskin and Others v. Turkey, ECtHR Judgment, 10 November 2004. Application no. 46117/99) paras. 
118-125. 
156 Ibid., at para.125. 
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(European) environmental laws. Boyle regards the Taşkin v. Turkey decision as not only 
demonstrating the Court’s willingness to address the procedural aspects of 
environmental decision-making processes in human rights terms, but also going so far 
as to ‘translate into European human rights law the procedural requirements set out in 
Principle 10 of the (1992) Rio Declaration (on Environment and Development) and 
elaborated in European environmental treaty law, despite the fact that Turkey is not a 
party to the Aarhus Convention.’157 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides that 
‘(E)nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level.’ It then goes on to highlight three aspects of this principle, 
beginning with access to environmental information, especially in respect of hazardous 
activities; moving on to opportunities for public participation; and finally, effective 
access to judicial or administrative proceedings to seek redress for any failings in 
respect of the first two aspects. All these elements are expanded in the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention (on access to information, public participation in decision-making and 
access to justice in environmental matters),158 generally regarded as the most advanced 
international treaty on public participation in environmental issues so far. These 
procedural environmental rights have also become part of EU (environmental) law. 
They are clearly significant procedural requirements for the achievement of 
‘environmental justice’. At a practical level, the implementation of these principles is 
                                            
157 Alan Boyle, ‘Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment’, Fordham Environmental 
Law Review, Vol. XVIII (2007) 471-511, at 497.  
158 Done at Aarhus, Denmark, 25 June 1998, entered into force: October, 2001. Currently: 47 parties. 
Accessible at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/introduction.html 
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therefore of the utmost importance to ensure a local community not only has a voice 
but is confident that its voice will be heard. 
 
 These international environmental principles and their derived procedural rights 
are referred to in Article 52 of the Kosovo Constitution. They are also elaborated by 
further and more specific environmentally-related laws promulgated by the Kosovo 
Assembly, such as the 2009 Law on Environmental Protection,159 and the 2009 Law on 
Environmental Impact Assessment.160 Despite the progressive inclusion of these 
environmental principles and rights within the Kosovo constitution and laws, the 
overall domestic (Kosovo) institutional governance for the implementation of these 
environmental laws still needs to be improved, as is notable from the Vermice-Merdar 
highway project case study. Under the sub-heading of ‘Transport Infrastructure’, 
para.25 of Annex I provides that the construction of a new or widened two-lane road of 
more than 5km requires an EIA under Article 5, para.1 of the 2009 Law on EIA. 
However, the initial Kosovo government decision-making process to undertake this 
project did not include any environmental considerations as the Environment (and 
Spatial Planning) ministry was not part of this process. Only the Transport and Finance 
ministries were involved at this stage. This is despite that fact that according to the 
Article 7 of the 2009 EIA Law, an applicant should not be licensed for construction and 
                                            
159 Law No.03/L-025, approved by the Kosovo Assembly on 26.02. 2009, and promulgated by the Decree 
of the President of the Republic of Kosovo No.DL-007-2009, on 19.03.2009. 
160 Law No. 03/L-024, approved by the Kosovo Assembly on 26.02. 2009 and promulgated by the Decree 
of the President of the Republic of Kosovo No. DL-006-2009, on 19.03.2009. 
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may not commence of a planned project without having completed the EIA procedure 
and obtained the Environmental Consent from the relevant Ministry.  
 
Following on from the above point and building on the fact noted above that 
under EULEX supervision, the Kosovo authorities are engaged in a long-term exercise 
to harmonize their legal standards on a range of issues, notably on environmental 
protection, we will also focus on specific EU law developments that afford 
opportunities for progress on environmental justice issues within Kosovo. These 
include the implementation of Aarhus Convention rights within EU Directives, as well 
as jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national (EU Member 
state) courts on the potential horizontal direct effect of Directives. Although these 
possible legal pathways for securing environmental justice are currently unavailable 
within the Kosovo jurisdiction, their potential application will be canvassed here on the 
assumption that the EULEX ‘standards beyond status’ strategy for Kosovo (noted 
above) will ultimately prove to be successful and result in the progressive integration 
of Kosovo within the EU policy and legal framework, if not quite EU membership in 
the foreseeable future. The following EU legislation forms the necessary standards of 
environmental justice that Kosovo will need to achieve in order to fulfil its Pre-
Accession candidate status for possible future EU membership. First, the EC/U 
Decision on application of the Aarhus Convention was adopted on 17 February 2005.161 
Then in 2003, two Directives concerning the first and second ‘pillars’ of the Aarhus 
Convention – access to environmental information and public participation - were 
                                            
161 See Decision 2005/370/EC. 
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adopted.162 Both these Directives also contain provisions on access to justice. 
Provisions for public participation are also found in a number of other Directives, 
notably, the 2001 Strategic Environment Assessment Directive, and the 2000 Water 
Framework Directive. Also, on 24 October 2003, the Commission presented a Proposal 
for a Directive on access to justice in environmental matters.163  
 
 Finally, ECJ jurisprudence has developed the doctrine of ‘direct effect’ of EC/U 
Treaty provisions and EC/U legislation, which is relevant to the application of these 
procedural environmental rights. When these EC/U measures are deemed precise, 
unconditional, and with any time limits for their implementation by the Member States 
having passed, they may be held to have legal effects such that individuals can rely 
directly on these provisions against public authorities within national courts. As 
Directives are binding only as to the result to be achieved, it was initially thought that 
they could not be relied upon directly by a private party against another private person. 
According to previous ECJ doctrine, EC/U Directives do not allow for legal effects 
against third-parties, besides the public authorities of the Member state. In the absence 
of domestic (Member state) implementing measures, Directives do not entail 
obligations for private legal individuals such as business corporations. They only have 
'vertical' but not 'horizontal' direct effect and are legally effective only against public 
authorities. Thus, the question of the ‘horizontal’ direct effect of a Directive under EU 
law against another private individual is problematic even for EU Member States, let 
                                            
162 Directive 2003/4/EC of 28 January 2003, and Directive 2003/35/EC of 26 May 2003, respectively. 
163 COM(2003) 624. Accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/ 
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alone entities with only Pre-Accession candidate status such as Kosovo. However, in 
Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority, it was held 
that art 5(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC) was directly effective, 
despite the Health Authority’s objection that it was acting as an employer and not a 
‘public authority’ when it acted against her. The ECJ held that although Directives have 
only ‘vertical’ rather than ‘horizontal’ direct effect, a Directive may nevertheless be 
relied on against the state ‘regardless of the capacity in which the latter is acting, 
whether employer or public authority.’164  
 
Both the ECJ and certain EU Member state domestic courts have interpreted the 
term ‘public authority’ broadly. Moreover, with so much that was previously in the 
public sector now having been privatised, some privatised utilities may still be 
considered to be part, or 'emanations', of the state and therefore falling within the 
definition of ‘public authority’ for the purposes of the application of an EC/U Directive. 
Emanations of the state are bodies which provide ‘public services’, and in doing so are 
able to exercise ‘special powers’ not usually available to private bodies, and which are 
still under the ‘control’ of the state. The seminal case of Foster v British Gas before the 
ECJ raised the possibility that privatized companies fulfilling public service functions 
such as utility (electricity, gas, and water) as well as waste treatment and disposal 
companies may be subject to EU law,165 including EC/U environmental law Directives. 
In the case of Griffin and others v South West Water Services Ltd. (SWW), argued before 
                                            
164 Case 152/84. [1986] European Court Reports (ECR) 723. 
165 Foster v British Gas [1990] ECR I-3313. 
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the English High Court,166 it was held that SWW - a privatized water company - could 
be bound by EC employment directives, although the relevant provisions in the specific 
Directive concerned were ultimately not considered to be sufficiently clear, precise and 
unconditional to be relied upon for the purpose of direct effect.167 According to Haigh, 
the High Court’s finding that privatized water companies may be bound by the 
horizontal direct effect of employment Directives could equally well apply to 
environmental Directives.168 As Kosovo is obliged to strive to meet the relevant EU 
environmental standards under the Pre-Accession Instrument (IPA), the possibility 
arises that once these EU environmental standards are promulgated within Kosovo 
laws, they too will be interpreted (for example, by EULEX appointed judges and/or 
prosecutors) as being applicable against any privatized entities permitted to run these 
services within Kosovo.  
 
 From the above discussion of the overall legal framework within Kosovo for 
the application of relevant environmental principles and rights, we can outline at least 
two separate legal avenues or techniques for ensuring the possible implementation of 
these rights. These are as follows: 
 
1. The extended interpretation placed on ECHR Article 8 rights against serious 
environmental interferences by the ECtHR case law jurisprudence – both of these being 
                                            
166 [1995] IRLR 15.  
167 See paras.140-141 of Griffin, op. cit. 
168 See Nigel Haigh, Manual of Environmental Policy: The EU and Britain, Longman, loose-leaf volume. 
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explicitly referred to in the Kosovo constitution and relevant Kosovo Assembly 
legislation as being applicable in Kosovo jurisdiction; 
 
2. The provision of procedural environmental rights under the 1998 Aarhus Convention 
and their incorporation into the European Union legal regime – a legal system that the 
Kosovo government will in turn need to import into its domestic law through its Pre-
Accession Agreement with the EU. Following this, the potential direct and even 
‘horizontal’ direct effect of EU Directives, according to ECJ case law jurisprudence, 
should also exert a normative pull on Kosovo public institutions, including privatized 
utilities, as Kosovo strives to meet its EU Pre-Accession candidate requirements.  
 
Conclusions 
Transitional environmental justice can play at least two important roles within the 
overall drive towards securing justice within a post-conflict society such as Kosovo. 
First, it can act as a means for conceptually recasting otherwise inextricable social 
conflicts in more nuanced terms, such that these underlying conflicts can be more 
practically mediated and eventually reconciled, even if never fully resolved. Second, as 
economic development generally, and socio-economic reconstruction in particular, is 
now seen as a vital element for the rejuvenation of societies in transition and thus 
increasingly included within the conceptualization of ‘transitional justice’, ‘transitional 
environmental justice’ can play a significant role in ensuring that an otherwise 
unremitting and unmitigated focus on economic reconstruction does not result in 
uneven levels of development that either entrench old ethnic/social divisions or create 
new socio-economic ones within already fragile transitional societies.  
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The potential for transitional environmental justice to become an essential 
element of the achievement of overall transitional justice within Kosovo has arguably 
been enhanced by the international and European institutional frameworks currently 
playing significant roles in Kosovo’s governance. Moreover, there is evidence of the 
progressive integration of environmental justice principles and mechanisms within the 
Kosovo legal system itself. However, despite creating ostensible legal pathways for 
environmental justice, the capacity and especially the political will of Kosovo’s 
domestic institutions to continue making progressive developments in this regard 
remains uncertain in the face of the competing socio-economic reconstruction 
imperative for this transitional polity. 
